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THE CANADIAN ARCTIC WATERS POLLUTION 
PREVENTION ACT: NEW STRESSES 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
Richard B. Bilder* 
O N June 17, 1970, the Canadian Parliament approved the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which asserts Canada's juris-
diction to regulate all shipping in zones up to 100 nautical miles off 
its Arctic coasts in order to guard against pollution of the region's 
coastal and marine resources.1 Related legislation extends Canada's 
territorial sea from three miles to twelve miles and authorizes the 
Government to establish exclusive Canadian fishing zones in marine 
areas adjacent to the coasts of Canada but beyond the new twelve-
mile territorial sea.2 At the same time that this legislation was intro-
• Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A. 1949, Williams College; LL.B. 
1956, Harvard University.-Ed. 
This Article is based upon a paper delivered at the Fifth Annual Law of the Sea 
Institute, University of Rhode Island, on June 17, 1970. I would like to express my 
appreciation to the University of Wisconsin Sea Grant Program, which has facilitated 
my study of international environmental problems. 
I. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47 (Can. 1970) [herein-
after Pollution Prevention Act]. The Act is reproduced in the Appendix following this 
Article. The bill (C-202, 28th Parl., 2d Sess., reprinted in 9 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 543 
(1970)) was introduced on April 8, 1970, and approved unanimously by the House of 
Commons on June 9, 1970, and by the Senate on June 17, 1970. Royal Assent was given 
on June 26. As of mid-September 1970 the Act had not yet been proclaimed; it is, 
however, considered "law" in that it is on the statute books, but it is not yet 
in force. The bill was considered by the House of Commons on April 8, 15, 16, 17, and 
22, and June 3, 4, and 9; the relevant debates for those dates are found in ll4 H.C. 
DEB. 5626, 5890-93, 5936-55 & 5960-77, 5993-6012, 6170-72, 7696-709, 7722-24, 7895-907 
(1970). It was considered by the Senate on June 9, IO, II, 16, and 17; the relevant debates, 
which were perfunctory, are printed in ll8 SEN. DEB. II75, 1201-04, 1215, 1241-43, 
1249 (1970). The hearings of the House Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, to which the bill was referred after the second reading, 
furnish an additional valuable source of legislative history. See Minutes of Proceedings 
and Evidence Before the House Standing Comm. on Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development Respecting Bill C-202, Nos. 15 (April 30, 1970), 16 (May 5, 1970), 17 
(May 7, 1970), and 19 (May 14, 1970). The Act is not applicable to Canada's east and 
west coasts. See note 87 infra. 
2. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 
68 (Can. 1970). The bill (C-203, 28th Parl., 2d Sess., reprinted in 9 INn.. LEGAL 
MATERIALS 553 (1970)) was also introduced on April 8, 1970, and was approved by the 
House of Commons on June 4, 1970, and by the Senate on June 18, 1970. Royal 
Assent to this Act was also given on June 26, and Canada has had a twelve-mile 
territorial sea since that date. However, parts of this Act require proclamation, and, 
as of mid-September 1970, no such proclamation had yet been made. Section 4 of the 
Act, adding § 5A to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act of 1964, 13 
Eliz. 2, c. 22 (Can.), authorizes the Governor in Council to establish a system of 
straight baselines, or "fisheries closing lines," as they were termed in the parliamentary 
debates, across the entrances of bodies of waters in special need of fishery conservation 
protection and where Canada has special historic fishing claims, thereby establishing 
exclusive Canadian fisheries zones in such areas. The Gulf of St. Lawrence, Bay of 
[I] 
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duced into the Canadian Parliament, the Government took steps to 
remove the possibility of a challenge in the International Court of 
Justice to its establishment of such contiguous pollution and fishery 
zones by adding a reservation to that effect to its long-standing 
acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.3 
The Canadian Pollution Prevention Act is of interest in several 
respects. It opens a new round in the historic and multifaceted 
struggle over freedom of the seas. It raises complex questions of 
international law and policy regarding the legal regime of Arctic 
waters, the concept of contiguous zones, the status of waters within 
archipelagoes, and the doctrines of innocent passage and interna-
tional straits. It illustrates both the perception of an increasing 
Fundy, Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait, and Queen Charlotte Sound were given as 
examples of such areas. See remarks of Hon. Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, 114 H.C. DEB. 6015-16 (April 17, 1970). See also An Act To Amend the 
Fisheries Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. - (Can. 1970), providing certain conforming amendments 
in existing legislation. I have not attempted in this Article to explore the many interest-
ing legal and other questions raised by the new fisheries legislation. They are, however, 
related to those raised by the Pollution Prevention Act. 
3. On April 7, 1970, the Canadian representative to the United Nations presented 
to Secretary-General U Thant a declaration amending Canada's acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by adding a reservation 
that Canada retains jurisdiction over 
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction of rights claimed or exercised 
by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution 
or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast 
of Canada. 
See N.Y. Times, April 9, 1970, at 13, col. 5. The full text of the present Canadian 
Declaration is appended to the Canadian Government's Background Notes on the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Bill and the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones 
Bill (April 8, 1970) [hereinafter Background Notes], and is reprinted in 9 INTL. 
LEGAL MATERIALS 598 (1970). 
The jurisdiction of the International Court generally depends upon specific consent 
of the parties to the dispute, expressed either in a special agreement or in a dispute 
settlement provision of a more general international agreement. However, under article 
36(2) (the so-called "optional clause') of the Statute of the Court (59 Stat. 1055 (1945), 
T.S. No. 993), the states parties to the Statute may at any time declare that they 
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any 
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in certain broad 
classes of legal disputes. Canada made such a declaration, with certain conditions, with 
respect to the Permanent Court of International Justice, on September 20, 1929, and 
this declaration was made applicable to the International Court of Justice, as the 
Permanent Court's successor, by I.C.J. STAT. art. 36(5). The 1929 Canadian Declaration 
is printed in J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 844-45 (1965). 
The Government has made it clear that it does not regard this new reservation as 
being applicable to disputes regarding the extension of the breadth of the Canadian 
territorial sea to twelve miles, and is prepared to submit any such disputes to the 
International Court. See, e.g., Notes for an Address by the Prime Minister to the Annual 
Meeting of the Canadian Press, Toronto, Ontario, April 15, 1970, at 9 (O.P.M. Press 
Rel., April 15, 1970) [hereinafter Prime Minister's Press Speech], reprinted in 9 INTL. 
LEGAL MATERIALS 600 (1970). 
November 1970] Canadian Pollution Prevention Act 3 
number of coastal states that existing international law and inter-
national arrangements are inadequate to protect their legitimate 
interests, and the strong pressures within such states for unilateral 
action to remedy these perceived deficiencies. It suggests, in partic-
ular, the type of stress that the growing concern on the part of 
coastal states regarding ocean pollution is likely to exert on tradi-
tional law-of-the-sea doctrines, and it also suggests the complex 
issues which may be involved in attempting to achieve international 
agreement on a regulatory regime adequate to prevent such pollution. 
Finally, the Act offers an instructive study of the international legal 
process in action. 
The immediate stimulus for the Canadian legislation was the 
historic voyage in the summer of 1969 of the United States tanker 
S.S. Manhattan through the waters and ice of the Northwest Passage, 
north of the Canadian mainland.4 The voyage was designed to 
demonstrate the feasibility of utilizing ice-breaking supertankers 
on this route for the large-scale transportation of oil from the devel-
oping oil fields of Alaska's North Slope to the markets of the Eastern 
Seaboard of the United States. Previously, the 1967 Torrey Canyon 
incident,is the 1968 Santa Barbara oil spill,6 and a succession of 
similar incidents had dramatically highlighted the environmental 
hazards posed by the possibility of maritime-tanker and oil-drilling 
4. The Manhattan, a 115,000-ton oil tanker owned by the Humble Oil & Refining 
Co., a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), was specially modified for the 
voyage. The ship sailed on August 24, 1969 (N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1969, at 1, col. 3), 
and completed navigation of the passage on September 14, 1969 (id., Sept. 15, 1969, at 1, 
col. 3). Canadian sensitivity was manifest during the voyage (see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 
21, 1969, § 4, at 8, cols. 1-5), and the voyage was frequently referred to during the 
parliamentary debates on the Pollution Prevention Act. 
On the long and romantic history of the search for a Northwest Passage between 
Europe and the Orient-a goal of navigators since Martin Frobisher's first unsuccessful 
attempt in 1576-see Pharand, Innocent Passage in the Arctic, 6 CAN. YB. INTL. L 3, 
42-47 (1968). The passage was first completed by Roald Amundsen in 1906. In 1960, the 
American nuclear submarine Seadragon accomplished the first underwater passage. 
5. In late March 1967 the S.S. Torrey Canyon, a 119,000-ton oil tanker, ran aground 
on rocks sixteen miles off the coast of Cornwall and split open, spilling more than 
35 million gallons of oil into the ocean and onto British and French beaches, killing 
large numbers of birds and fish, and giving rise to a series of complex and protracted 
legal claims by both private individuals and the British and French governments. See, 
e.g., E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); C. GILL, F. 
BOOKER &: T. SOPER, THE WRECK OF THE TORREY CANYON (1967); Nanda, The "Torrey 
Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400 (1967). 
6. The blowout of the Union Oil Co. well in the Santa Barbara Channel 
off the coast of California occurred in late January and early February 1968, and 
coated 400 square miles of ocean and forty miles of shoreline with oil. TIME, Feb. 14, 
1968, at 23-25. See Baldwin, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, 42 CoLO. L. REv. 33 (1970). 
See generally Note, Continental Shelf Oil Disasters: Challenge to International Pollution 
Control, 55 CoRNELL L REv. 113 (1969). 
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accidents.7 The Manhattan's feat gave warning that Canada's Arctic 
environment might soon be subjected to similar threats.8 The im-
mediacy of the potential problem was further underlined in Cana-
dian public consciousness by the grounding of the Liberian tanker 
Arrow in February 1970 in Chadabucto Bay off Nova Scotia, which 
caused oil pollution of the waters and adjacent coast.9 
Canada's fear of oil pollution of its Arctic waters and coasts based 
on these recent maritime disasters is heightened by a number of 
factors. The Canadian North as well as the Arctic region above the 
Canadian mainland have long held a special place in nationalistic 
sentiments; Canadians regard the area as a treasured part of their 
national heritage, and it has been referred to as Canada's "last 
frontier" and a touchstone of the Canadian identity.10 More mate-
rialistically, Canada holds great hopes for the exploration and ex-
7. See generally, on ocean oil pollution problems, Note, Oil Pollution and the Sea, 
10 HARV. INTL. L.J. 316 (1969); Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. 
R.Ev. 155 (1968); INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON OIL POLLUTION OF THE SEA, Rl:PORT 
OF PROCEEDINGS HELD IN ROME, OCTOBER 1968 (1969) [hereinafter ROME PROCEEDINGS]. 
Statistics cited in the Harvard International Law Journal Note, supra, at 317-19, give 
some sense of the dimensions of the problem. It is estimated that oil influxes into the 
sea from shipping activities currently amount to at least 1 million metric tons per year, 
but the actual amount may be much greater. Most of these losses result from 
"deballasting," cleaning activities, and minor accidents, rather than from major 
accidents. In 1968 the world's tanker fleet numbered 4,300 ships and transported more 
than 700 million tons of oil; one ship out of every five in the world's merchant fleet 
was engaged in transporting oil and almost all of these ships were powered by oil. 
In contrast to existing "supertankers" (the Torrey Canyon was 119,000 tons and the 
Manhattan is 115,000 tons), some sixty tankers of 150,000 tons or more are now on 
order throughout the world; a Japanese company has launched a 276,000-ton tanker 
and other Japanese yards have orders for tankers as large as 312,000 tons. 
8. During the parliamentary debates, one member reported that when the 
Manhattan was placed in drydock after its voyage, two large holes were dis-
covered in the cargo tanks below the waterline; if oil, not water, had been carried 
on the test run, there presumably would have been substantial spillage. See remarks 
of Mr. Perrault, 114 H.C. DEB. 5973 (April 16, 1970). With respect to the Manhattan's 
second voyage, commencing in the spring of 1970, the Canadian Government imposed 
a number of conditions on the owners, including a requirement of icebreaker escort, 
a series of safety modifications and requirements, and a minimum of $6.5 million in 
accident insurance. N.Y. Times, April 5, 1970, at 27, col. I. 
One industry projection is that thirty giant 250,000-ton ice-breaking tankers will 
ultimately be needed to move Alaskan North Slope oil to the east coast of the United 
States through the Northwest Passage if this method of transportation is selected to 
supply the Eastern Seaboard. Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1969, at 8, cols. 2-3. In the late fall 
of 1969, General Dynamics Corp. formally proposed to five major oil companies 
operating on the North Slope the building of six 170,000-ton nuclear submarines, 
each carrying up to 300,000 tons of oil, to transport oil to the east coast under the water 
and ice of the Northwest Passage. Id. 
9. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1970, at 78, col. 1. The Arrow incident is frequently 
referred to in the parliamentary debates. 
10. See, e.g., Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 1-5; Lloyd, Canada's 
Arctic in the Age of Ecology, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 726 (1970). 
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ploitation of the potential mineral resources of this vast region, a 
process which has barely begun.11 The dangers which utilization of 
the Northwest Passage pose to this unique environment are generally 
considered by Canadians to be particularly acute. For one thing, 
the hazards of Arctic navigation substantially increase the risk of 
maritime accidents. Moreover, the peculiar ecology of the Arctic 
region-an environment in which life exists only precariously-
coupled with the slow rate of hydrocarbon decomposition in a 
frigid climate and the difficulty of dispelling oil in Arctic areas, 
might cause any major oil spill to have disastrous and irreversible 
ecological consequences. Indeed, under these conditions, even small 
amounts of oil pollution could be extremely damaging.12 Thus it is 
not surprising that Canada takes the view that it has both a special 
interest in its Arctic environment and a particular responsibility to 
protect it from the threat of oil pollution. 
However, while Canada's motivation is apparent, its right to 
establish regulations aimed at preventing pollution throughout this 
broad Arctic area is less than clear.13 The Northwest Passage com-
prises not one route, but rather several possible routes through the 
archipelago north of the Canadian mainland. The most feasible 
route for international navigation is likely to be that commencing 
in the east in Lancaster Sound, running west through Barrow Strait 
and Viscount Melville Sound, then southwest through Prince of 
Wales Strait between Banks and Victoria Islands, and finally west 
again along the north coast of the mainland into Prudhoe Bay in 
the Beaufort Sea.14 Canada has long asserted territorial claims to the 
11. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 10, at 731-32, 734-35. 
12. See Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 6-7. The ecological dangers 
posed by oil pollution are stressed in parliamentary debates and are specifically referred 
to in the preamble to the Pollution Prevention Act. For general discussions of the 
ecological effects of oil pollution, see "TORREY CANYON" POLLUTION AND MARINE LIFE 
a. Smith ed. 1968), various papers collected in Ror.rn PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, and 
Note, supra note 7, at 321-22, citing references. 
13, For comprehensive discussions of the history and recent status of various 
Canadian Arctic claims, including the "sector theory," Canadian claims to waters of 
the Canadian Archipelago, and the status of the Northwest Passage, see Head, 
Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9 McGILL L.J. 200 
(1963); Pharand, Innocent Passage in the Arctic, 6 CAN. YB. INTL. L. 3 (1968); Smith, 
Sovereignty in the North: The Canadian Aspect of an International Problem, in 
THE ARCTIC FRONTIER 194 (R. MacDonald ed. 1966). Professor Head's article is of 
particular interest since he is currently serving as Legislative Assistant to Prime 
Minister Trudeau and was presumably involved in the preparation of the Pollution 
Prevention Bill. 
14. Pharand, supra note 13, at 48. An alternate route is through the more northerly 
but much wider McClure Strait rather than Prince of Wales Strait, but ice is more 
likely to be encountered on this route. 
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islands of the archipelago along this route and those claims do not 
appear to be challenged.15 Canada has also made clear its claim to 
exclusive exploitation of the continental shelf north of the main-
land, and this claim also seems uncontested.16 On the other hand, 
while there seems to be broad international consensus that the 
waters of the Arctic Ocean are "high seas,"17 the status of the waters 
within the Canadian Archipelago is more controversial. 
The Canadian position regarding these archipelagic waters was 
itself for a long time ambiguous.18 Before the recent legislation 
was passed, Canada claimed only a three-mile territorial sea, which 
would, except for Prince of Wales Strait, leave a narrow strip of 
"high seas" throughout most of the Northwest Passage. With its 
present claim of a twelve-mile territorial sea, more of the channels 
-Barrow Strait in particular-become wholly territorial waters, but 
substantial portions of the rest of the Northwest Passage would pre-
sumably still remain high seas. However, the Canadian claim of 
jurisdiction in the archipelago appears now to rest on an archipelagic 
theory rather than on a twelve-mile territorial-sea theory. Recent 
statements indicate that Canada considers all of the waters within 
the Arctic Archipelago "Canadian waters" without regard to the 
15. See generally references cited in note 13 supra; remarks of Prime Minister 
Trudeau, 114 H.C. DEB. 40 (Oct. 24, 1969); J. CAsrEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (1965). 
16. See remarks of Prime Minister Trudeau, 114 H.C. DEB. 40 (Oct. 24, 1969), 
and of External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, 114 H.C, DEB. 6014 (April 17, 1970). 
The right of a coastal state to exercise sovereign rights over its continental shelf for the 
purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources is recognized by 
article 2(1) of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature 
April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter 
Continental Shelf Convention], to which forty-one countries, including the United 
States and Canada (as of Feb. 6, 1970), are presently parties. (Canada is not a party 
to any of the other three Geneva Law of the Sea Conventions). The International Court, 
in the recent North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark), [1969] I.C.J. 3, has held that 
this right now has become a principle of customary international law. The Court's 
decision in the North Seas Continental Shelf Cases is digested and excerpted at 63 AM. 
J. INTL. L. 591 (1969), and reprinted in 8 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 340 (1969). 
17. See Pharand, Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic Ocean, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 210 
(1969). A recent incident involving the alleged murder of one United States national 
by another on Fletcher's Ice Island, which floats about 325 miles from the North Pole, 
has brought related issues to public attention. See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1970, at 1, col, 3, 
For a discussion of the complex jurisdictional problems raised by incidents of misconduct 
in polar regions, particularly Antarctica, see Bilder, Control of Criminal Conduct in 
Antarctica, 52 VA. L. REv. 231 (1966). 
18. See, e.g., Pharand, supra note 13, at 56, where he concludes, after surveying the 
literature, that "it is difficult to ascertain Canada's official policy with respect to the 
waters within the Arctic archipelago ••.• " But see Head, supra note 13, at 218, where 
he states that "Canada regards the waters between the islands as territorial waters •••• " 
As of the time of the Manhattan's first voyage, Prime Minister Trudeau himself 
expressed doubt concerning the status of the waters. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 
23, col. I. See generally id., Sept. 8, 1969, at 23, col. I. 
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breadth of the territorial sea.19 Apparently such territorial waters 
are considered at most to be subject to such rights of "innocent 
passage" as are determined by Canada to exist.20 
Uncontested Canadian sovereignty over key straits, coupled per-
haps with Canada's claim over all archipelagic waters, might have 
provided a feasible basis for an assertion of Canadian jurisdiction 
over the Northwest Passage. However, the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act appears to be based on a separate and more far-
reaching contiguous-zone theory.21 A brief summary of the Act 
should make this theory clear. 
19. See Summary of Canadian Note Handed to the United States Government on 
April 16, 1970, ll4 H.C. DEB. 6027, 6028-29 (April 17, 1970) [hereinafter Canadian 
Note], reprinted in 9 INTL. I.EcAL MAT.ERIALS 607 (1970). On the Canadian claim to the 
archipelagic waters, see also Minister Sharp's remarks that "we claim these to be 
Canadian territorial waters," ll4 H.C. DEB. 5953 (April 16, 1970), and that "we 
regard the waters between the islands as our waters, and we always have." ll4 H.C. 
DEB. 6015 (April 17, 1970). Indeed, the Prime Minister has suggested that the 
Government may regard Beaufort Sea as something less than "high seas." See Prime 
Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at IO. 
20. Concerning the question of innocent passage, see notes 79-84 infra and accom-
panying text. 
21. The Government repeatedly emphasized that the Act was based upon a 
functional exercise of coastal-state jurisdiction to protect against threats of coastal 
and coastal-water pollution rather than a claim of sovereignty. See, e.g., the Prime 
Minister's press interview of April 16, 1970, where he said of the new bill: "It is not 
an assertion of sovereignty: it is an exercise of our desire to keep the Arctic free of 
pollution •••• " Quoted at ll4 H.C. DEB. 5955 (April 16, 1970); see also Prime 
Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 9. 
It is interesting to note that the principal parliamentary controversy concerning 
the Act involved the question whether the Government's decision to base controls on 
a contiguous-zone theory, rather than on a specific claim of sovereignty over the 
archipelagic waters, coupled with its extension of the territorial sea to a specific limit 
of twelve miles, amounted to a weakening or abandonment of the Canadian archipelagic 
claim. See, e.g., remarks of Mr. Stanfield, ll4 H.C. DEB. 5941-43 (April 16, 1970). The 
issue was sharpened by the fact that the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development of the House of Commons had specifically recommended that 
Canada assert sovereignty over the waters of the archipelago. See text of the Committee's 
first report in VorES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA, No. 38, at 
207-10 (Dec. 16, 1969), and references to the report at ll4 H.C. DEB. 5943, 5969 (April 
16, 1970). However, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Mitchell 
Sharp, took the position that none of these actions weakened Canadian claims 
to sovereignty, citing the decision in North Atlantic Fisheries Case (United 
States v. Canada), II U.N.R.I.A.A. 167 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910), to hold that a state 
may, without prejudice to its claim to sovereignty over the whole of a particular 
area of the sea, exercise only so muclx of its sovereign powers over such part of that 
area as may be necessary for its immediate purposes. The Government's reluctance t'o 
be forced into unambiguous statements on the sovereignty issue is apparent throughout 
the debates. See, e.g., Minister Sharp's statement that, while Canada would "not back 
down one inclx from [its] basic position on sovereignty ••• there is no interest on the 
part of the Canadian government in the exercise of clxauvinism." II4 H.C. DEB. 6015 
(April 17, 1970). See also II4 H.C. DEB. 5949 (April 17, 1970). While the opposition 
ultimately managed to elicit such relatively clear statements, see note 19 supra, the 
Government continued to play this aspect of the matter in low key. A move to amend 
the bill to provide that "[n]othing in this Act shall in any way be construed as incon-
sistent with Canada's rightful claim of sovereignty in and over the water, ice and 
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The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act deals with pollution 
arising from shipping, from land-based installations, and from com-
mercial activities, such as oil drilling, carried out on the Canadian 
Continental Shelf. The Act's provisions apply to "arctic waters" 
which are defined as waters in both a liquid and a frozen state 
"adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic within 
the area enclosed by the sixtieth parallel of north latitude, the one 
hundred and forty-first meridian of longitude and a line measured 
seaward from the nearest Canadian land a distance of one hundred 
nautical miles .... "22 In addition, "arctic waters" include waters 
adjacent to those in the area described above to the extent that 
such adjacent waters overlie "submarine areas [that] Her Majesty 
in right of Canada has the right to dispose of or exploit"23 insofar as 
the Act applies to persons exploring for, developing, or exploiting 
natural resources in such submarine areas.24 
The Act prohibits, and prescribes penalties for, the deposit of 
"waste" in Arctic waters or on the islands or mainland under condi-
tions which may cause such waste to enter the Arctic waters,25 and 
further requires that any deposit of waste or danger thereof be 
reported.26 Exceptions to these requirements may be authorized by 
the Governor in Council.27 The Governor in Council may also order 
the destruction or removal of ships in distress which are depositing 
waste or which are likely to deposit waste in Arctic waters.28 The 
definition of "waste" is comprehensive and covers, among other things, 
"any substance that, if added to any waters, would degrade or alter 
. . . those waters to any extent that is detrimental to their use by 
man or by any animal, fish or plant that is useful to man .... "29 
land areas of the Arctic regions between the degrees of longitude 60 and longitude 141" 
met with procedural difficulties and was withdrawn. 114 H.C. DEB. 7704•09 CTune 3, 
1970); id. 7722-23 CTune 4, 1970). 
22. Pollution Prevention Act, 18·19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 3(1) (Can. 1970) (emphasis 
added). An exception is that the line of equidistance between the Canadian 
Arctic islands and Greenland is substituted for the 100-mile line where the 
equidistance-line is less than 100 miles from the Canadian coast. The 141st 
meridian of longitude is the line defining the northern portion of the Canadian-Alaskan 
boundary. 
23. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 3(2) (Can. 1970). This definition 
encompasses the water overlying the continental shelf. 
24. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, §§ 3(2), 6(l)(a) (Can. 1970). 
25. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 4 (Can. 1970). 
26. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 5 (Can. 1970). 
27. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 4 (Can. 1970). In Canadian prac-
tice, a delegation to the Governor in Council is, in effect, to the Prime Minister and 
his Cabinet. See R. CHEFFINS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IN CANADA 72-73 (1969), 
and R. DAWSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 230 (4th ed. 1963). 
28. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 13 (Can. 1970). 
29. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 2(h) (Can. 1970). Attempts to 
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The Governor in Council may, by order, prescribe as a "shipping 
safety control zone" any area of the Arctic waters.80 He may then 
make regulations relating to navigation in such zones and prohibit 
any ship from entering any zone unless it meets the prescribed 
regulations. Such regulations may relate to hull and fuel tank con-
struction, navigational aids, safety equipment, qualification of per-
sonnel, time and route of passage, pilotage, icebreaker escort, and 
so forth.31 At certain times of the year, or when certain ice conditions 
prevail, ships may be completely banned from entering any given 
zone.32 Finally, the Governor in Council may exempt from the 
application of such regulations any ship or class of ships that is 
owned or operated by a sovereign power other than Canada when 
he is satisfied that such ships comply with standards substantially 
equivalent to those prescribed by Canadian regulations and that all 
reasonable precautions will be taken by those ships to reduce the 
danger of any deposit of waste.33 
The Act further provides for the appointment of "pollution 
prevention officers"34 having broad powers, including authority both 
to board ships within a shipping safety control zone for inspection 
purposes, and to order ships in or near a safety control zone to 
remain outside it if the officers suspect that the ships do not comply 
with the standards applicable within the zone.85 
The remedial provisions of the Act are far-reaching. Any person 
who deposits waste in Arctic waters in violation of the Act is liable 
arrive at an operationally useful definition of marine pollution raise complex and 
fundamental questions. Compare the Canadian definition, with the definition suggested 
by the International Oceanographic Commission and accepted by the Joint IMCO/ 
FAO/TJNESCO/WMO Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, 
which defines marine pollution as: 
Introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment (including estuaries) resulting in such deleterious effects as harm to 
living resources, hazard to human health, hindrance to marine activities including 
fishing, impairment of quality for use as sea water and reduction of amenities. 
Comprehensive Outline of the Scope of the Long-Term and Expanded Programme of 
Oceanic Research, U.N. Doc. A/7750, pt. I, at 3 (Nov. IO, 1969). 
30. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 11 (Can. 1970). 
31. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 12 (Can. 1970). 
32. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 12(l)(c) (Can. 1970). 
33. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 12(2) (Can. 1970). 
34. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 14 (Can. 1970). 
35. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 15 (Can. 1970). Pollution preven-
tion officers may also be empowered to enter any land-based operation undergoing con-
struction, alteration, or extension, that may result in the deposit of waste in Arctic 
waters, to determine whether adequate standards are being complied with (§ 15), and 
the Governor in Council may issue instructions requiring any modifications to the 
work, or prohibit it entirely (§ 10). Pollution prevention officers may perform similar 
functions with respect to commercial operations carried out on the continental shelf 
(§ 15). 
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to a fine not exceeding 5,000 dollars, and any ship that deposits such 
waste is liable to a fine not exceeding 100,000 dollars, with each day 
on which the offense is committed being considered a separate of-
fense. 36 In addition, any person failing to make required reports to 
pollution control officers or otherwise failing to comply with various 
orders or regulations, and any ship navigating within a shipping 
safety control zone while not complying with standards or regula-
tions or otherwise failing to comply with various provisions of 
the Act is liable to fines not exceeding 25,000 dollars.37 Furthermore, 
a pollution prevention officer may, with the consent of the Governor 
in Council, seize a ship and its cargo anywhere in the Arctic waters 
or elsewhere in the territorial sea or the internal or inland waters of 
Canada when he suspects on reasonable grounds that the ship, or 
the ship or cargo owners have contravened the provisions of the Act.38 
When a ship is convicted of an offense under the Act, a Canadian 
court may order the forfeiture of both the ship and its cargo in addi-
tion to any other penalty imposed.39 
The Act also provides for civil liability both for all costs and ex-
penses incurred by the Canadian Government with regard to the 
violation and for actual loss or damage incurred by other persons 
resulting from the deposit of waste by persons engaged in exploring 
for, developing, or exploiting the natural resources on the land ad-
jacent to the Artie waters or in the submarine areas below the Arctic 
waters, or by persons carrying on any undertaking on the mainland 
or the islands of the Canadian Arctic or on Arctic waters, or by the 
owners of ships navigating within the Arctic waters and ovmers of 
the cargo of any such ship.40 Such civil liability is absolute and does 
not depend upon proof of fault or negligence;41 however, the Act 
does provide that the Governor in Council may make regulations 
establishing limits of liability for various classes of persons. For ex-
ample, with respect to ship and cargo owners, the limitation of li-
ability shall take into account the size of the ship and the nature and 
quality of the cargo carried.42 The Governor in Council may also 
require evidence of financial responsibility adequate to cover the 
costs of cleanup and damage resulting from any pollution to be pro-
vided by persons exploiting the natural resources in the land adja-
36. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 18 (Can. 1970). 
37. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 19 (Can. 1970). 
38. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 23(1) (Can. 1970). 
39. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 24(1) (Can. 1970). 
40. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 6 (Can. 1970). 
41. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 7(1) (Can. 1970). 
42. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 9 (Can. 1970). 
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cent to the Arctic waters, and by owners of ships and cargo, when 
such ships are navigating within any shipping safety control zone 
specified by the Governor in Council where deposit of its cargo ( oil, 
for instance) would constitute "waste."43 Finally, the Act sets out pro-
cedures for resolving damage claims in the Canadian courts.44 
The Canadian Government was well aware that the Pollution 
Prevention Act might raise foreign-relations problems, particularly 
with the United States,45 and its expectations were realized. The 
American response was prompt and legalistic. On April 9, 1970, a 
State Department spokesman stated that: 
We regret the introduction of this legislation by the Canadian 
Government which, in our view, constitutes a unilateral approach 
to a problem which we believe should be resolved by cooperative 
international action. 
The United States does not recognize any exercise of coastal state 
jurisdiction over our vessels in the high seas and thus does not recog-
nize the right of any state unilaterally to establish a territorial sea 
of more than three miles or exercise more limited jurisdiction in any 
area beyond 12 miles.46 
He added, however, that the United States "is prepared promptly to 
seek either bilateral or multilateral solutions to these problems in 
the framework of international law.''47 
In a further statement on April 15, reflecting an official note to 
the Canadian Government, the Department of State developed its 
position more fully: 
International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral 
extensions of jurisdiction on the high seas, and the United States 
can neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction. 
43. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 8 (Can. 1970). 
44. Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 6(3) (Can. 1970). 
45. Canadian officials had emphasized the Government's view of its special respon-
sibilities with respect to the Northwest Passage since at least the fall of 1969, see, e.g., 
the statements by External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, reported in N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 19, 1969, at 3, col. 1, and by Transport Minister, Donald Jamieson, reported in 
id., Nov. 26, 1969, at 14, cols. 1-6, and the probability of legislation was indicated in 
the Speech from the Throne and the Prime Minister's remarks in the ensuing debate. 
114 H.C. DEB. 1-3 (Oct. 24, 1969); id. 34-43; N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1969, at 4, col. 3. On 
November 11, 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau discussed Canadian concern regarding 
Arctic pollution with United Nations Secretary-General U Thant, stating in a news 
conference afterwards that "[w]e owe it to the world to do something [on pollution]." 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1969, at 7, col. I. The issue was a subject of discussion at a 
Canadian-United States Ministerial Meeting in June 1969, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1969, 
at 3, col. 1, and was a principal topic at further United States-Canadian high-level 
discussions on March 11, 1970, in Washington and March 20, in Ottawa. 114 H.C. DEB. 
5952-53 (April 16, 1970). 
46. Statement of Robert J. McCloskey, N.Y. Times, April 10, 1970, at 13, col. 3. 
47. Id. 
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We are concerned that this action by Canada if not opposed by 
us, would be taken as a precedent in other parts of the world for 
other unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas. If Canada 
had the right to claim and exercise exclusive pollution and resource 
jurisdiction on the high seas, other countries could assert the right 
to exercise jurisdiction for other purposes, some reasonable and some 
not, but all equally invalid according to international law.48 
The State Department asked the Canadian Government to defer 
making its proposed legislation effective until an international 
agreement was reached. However, in the event that the Canadian 
Government was unwilling to make this concession, the State De-
partment urged that the issue be voluntarily submitted to the In-
ternational Court of Justice. 
The Canadian Government, in turn, promptly rejected the Amer-
ican position and suggestions. In a note delivered to the United 
States Government on April 16, 1970,49 the Ministry of External 
Affairs stated that the Pollution Prevention Bill was justified since 
it was "based on the overriding right of self-defence of coastal states 
to protect themselves against grave threats to their environment";50 
that such extensions of jurisdiction for limited protective purposes 
outside the territorial seas had ample precedent, particularly in 
American practice; and that, while the Canadian Government was 
prepared to participate in international efforts to deal with the prob-
lem, it was not prepared to await the development of international 
rules as the solution. Indeed, the Canadian Government viewed its 
own unilateral action as a positive contribution to the development 
of such rules since it is a well-established principle that customary 
international law is developed by state practice. Moreover, the Cana-
dian Government refused to accept the American suggestion that 
the Northwest Passage constituted high seas, that it was an inter-
national strait, or that the waters of the Arctic Archipelago were 
other than Canadian. Finally, Canada would not agree to submit the 
dispute to the International Court. Canada then proceeded to enact 
the new legislation and the United States in turn proceeded with 
plans to convene an international conference on Arctic pollution 
problems, to be held in the fall of 1970. 
48. Dept. of State Press Rel. No. 121 (April 15, 1970), reprinted in 9 INTL. LEGAL 
MATERIALS 605 (1970); N.Y. Times, April 16, 1970, at 6, cols. 1-2. Subsequently, the 
Canadian newspapers prominently reported a statement by State Department Assistant 
Legal Advisor Robert H. Neuman, made in testimony in mid-July before Senator Mus-
kie's Air and W'ater Quality Subcommittee, that Canada had "absolutely no right to 
enact" legislation asserting such a 100-mile-wide pollution prevention zone. See Mont-
real Star, July 22, 1970, at 12, col. l; Toronto Daily Star, July 23, 1970, at 4. 
49. Canadian Note, supra note 19. 
50. Id. at 6028. 
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There are many aspects of the Arctic Waters Pollution Preven-
tion Act which are of interest from the standpoint of interna-
tional law and the functioning of the international legal order. Of 
chief interest, of course, is the question whether the Pollution 
Prevention Act violates existing international law, particularly in 
its assertion of jurisdiction to regulate shipping in a contiguous zone 
up to 100 miles off Canada's northern coasts. As previously indicated, 
the Act seems to be based on the theory of Canada's right to exercise 
jurisdiction for pollution control purposes on the high seas con-
tiguous to but outside of Canadian territorial waters, rather than on 
the theory that the waters embraced in the legislation are territorial 
or internal waters subject to Canadian sovereignty.151 In general, in-
ternational law prohibits any state from purporting to subject any 
part of the high seas to its sovereignty, or from interfering with the 
exercise of freedom of navigation by ships sailing under other states' 
flags on the high seas.152 However, international law does recognize 
a limited exception to these principles in the concept of the "con-
tiguous zone," which permits a coastal state to exercise jurisdiction 
for certain purposes in areas of the high seas lying somewhat outside 
its territorial sea.53 In essence, Canada justifies the Pollution Pre-
vention Act as being within the scope of this contiguous-zone ex-
ception. 
The most authoritative evidence of the present state of inter-
national law on the subject of contiguous zones is found in the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone.114 While Canada is not party to the convention, thirty-seven 
other nations are, including the United States, the United Kingdom, 
51. See note 21 supra. 
52. International law in this respect is codified in the Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, (1962) 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 
450 U.N.T .S. 82 (hereinafter High Seas Convention), which entered into force for the 
United States on September 30, 1962. As of July I, 1970, forty-four states were parties. 
Article I of the convention defines the "high seas" as "all parts of the sea that are not 
included in the territorial waters or in the internal waters of a state." Article 2 of the 
convention provides: 
The high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to subject 
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas ••• comprises, inter 
alia ••• (I) freedom of navigation. 
Article 6 provides that, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international 
treaties or the convention, a ship shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of its 
flag state on the high seas. Article 22 of the convention prohibits warships from board-
ing foreign merchant ships on the high seas except under special circumstances not here 
relevant (suspicion of piracy, slave trade, or flying a false flag). 
53. See generally M. McDOUGAL &: w. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS ch. 
6 (1962). 
54. Opened for signature April 29, 1958, (1964) 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention], which entered into force for the 
United States September 10, 1964. 
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France, and the Soviet Union, and widely accepted "law-making" 
conventions of this nature are considered relevant evidence of cus-
tomary international law.111> Article 24(1) of the Territorial Sea 
Convention provides that, in a zone of the high seas contiguous to 
the territorial sea, a coastal state may exercise the control necessary 
to "[p]revent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea" and to 
"[p ]unish infringement of the above regulations committed within 
its territory or territorial sea."56 Paragraph 2 of article 24, however, 
specifically provides that: "The contiguous zone may not extend 
beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured.''57 While the inclusion of "sanitary 
regulations" as a recognized basis of jurisdiction within the per-
mitted twelve-mile contiguous zone could reasonably be read to 
include pollution prevention regulations, the assertion of pollution 
control jurisdiction beyond twelve miles-the present breadth of 
Canada's territorial sea-appears to be inconsistent with the con-
vention.58 
Any argument that pollution problems were not contemplated 
by the Law of the Sea Conventions, and that article 24(2) of the 
Territorial Sea Convention is thus not pertinent to the issue of 
contiguous zones established for the specific purpose of pollution 
prevention, seems refuted by the express reference to oil pollution 
55. See generally the decision of the International Court in the North Seas Conti-
nental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3. See note 16 supra. It should be noted, however, that 
while the Court in that case recognized that the general principle of coastal-states' rights 
in the continental shelf had become customary law, the Court went on to reject the 
contention that article 6(1) of the convention, setting out particular methods of delimit• 
ing competence between contiguous states, had given rise to such a rule of customary 
law. See also Letter from Secretary of State Rusk to Attorney General Kennedy, Jan. 15, 
1963, in 2 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 527 (1963), taking the position that the Territorial 
Sea Convention, supra note 54, although not yet entered into force, "must be regarded 
in view of its adoption by a large majority of the States of the world as the best 
evidence of international law on the subject at the present time." Pharand, supra note 
13, at 59, indicates that Canada, while not a party to the Geneva Law of the Sea Con-
ventions, apparently recognizes many of their provisions as codifying customary in-
ternational law. 
56. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 54, art. 24(1). 
57. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 54, art. 24(2). 
58. Even if the term "sanitary regulations" is read to include antipollution measures, 
such measures could, under the convention, only be applied with respect to damage 
likely to be caused within the territory or the territorial sea of the state concerned. 
The United States itself has recently adopted more stringent legislation to deal with 
offshore pollution. See the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 
84 Stat. 91. However, while the Act generally prohibits discharges of oil "into or upon 
the waters of the contiguous zone" (§ ll(a)(9)), the term "contiguous zone" is carefully 
defined to mean the "zone established under Article 24 of the Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone" (§ ll(b)(2)). See also President Nixon's Message 
to Congress on Offshore Oil Pollution, May 20, 1970, reprinted in 62 DEPT. STATE BULL. 
754 (1970). 
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in article 24 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,119 
drafted at the same conference as the Territorial Sea Convention, 
which provides that: 
Every state shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the 
seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from 
the exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of 
existing treaty provisions on the subject.60 
The reference in article 24 to "existing treaty provisions" is pri-
marily directed to the 1954 International Convention for the Pre-
vention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil,61 which has since been 
amended in 196262 and 1969.63 This latter convention, however, 
which is presently the only international agreement dealing broadly 
with the preventive aspects of ship-borne marine pollution, does not 
confer any authority on coastal states to assert jurisdiction for pollu-
tion control purposes beyond the twelve-mile contiguous zone; in-
deed, enforcement of the convention's prohibitions is left expressly 
to the flag state of the offending vessel rather than the interested 
coastal state.6' 
59. High Seas Convention, supra note 52, art. 24. Since the conventions were drafted 
simultaneously at a single conference, they are presumably to be construed in pari 
materia. 
60. See also article 25 of the High Seas Convention, supra note 52, which requires 
states parties to take measures to prevent pollution of the sea by radioactive materials 
and other harmful agents, and article 5(7) of the Continental Shelf Convention, supra 
note 16, which provides that a coastal state engaging in the exploration of the conti-
nental shelf and exploitation of its natural resources is obliged to take "all appropriate 
measures for the protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents." 
61. opened for signature May 12, 1954, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 
U.N.T .S. 3 [hereinafter Oil Pollution Convention]. The convention entered into force 
in 1958. Canada became a party to the convention in 1956. The United States became 
a party on December 8, 1961, subject to an understanding, reservations, and a recom-
mendation. 75 Stat. 402 (1961), T.I.A.S. No. 4900, at 36-39. As of July 1, 1970, forty-two 
states were parties. 
62. April 11, 1962, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332. The 
1962 amendments entered into force in 1967. As of July 1, 1970, forty-one states had 
accepted these amendments. 
63. The 1969 amendments are annexed to IMCO Ass. Res. A.175 (VI) (Oct. 21, 1969). 
On May 20, 1970, President Nixon requested Senate consent to ratification of these 
amendments. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1970, at I, col. 3; 62 DEPT. STATE BULL. 756-57 (1970). 
64. The Oil Pollution Convention generally prohibits, with certain exceptions, the 
discharge of oil or oily wastes within certain defined zones. The prohibited zones are 
established for the most part as "all sea areas within 50 miles from land," (annex A(l)) 
but certain zones have a greater or less breadth. The convention applies to all sea-going 
ships, again with certain exceptions such as vessels under 500 tons gross tonnage, but 
different standards are applicable for tankers than for other ships. 
Each signatory is required to ensure that facilities for dealing with oily wastes are 
available at its main ports, and that each of its vessels carries an oil record book specify-
ing the ship's operations involving the recovery or discharge of oil or oily wastes. The 
oil record book is to be open to inspection by port authorities in any port of the states 
parties. Any infraction of UJe convention "shall be an offence punishable under the 
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The Canadian legal position seems further weakened by the fact 
that neither of the two conventions adopted by the recent Inter-
national Conference on Marine Pollution Damage, which was held 
in Brussels in the fall of 1969 to deal specifically with such prob-
lems,65 purports to extend beyond the twelve-mile contiguous zone 
the jurisdiction of coastal states to regulate shipping for pollution 
control purposes. One of these conventions, the International Con-
vention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (the so-called 
"private law" convention), is concerned solely with the limits of 
liability for pollution damage rather than with its prevention or 
general regulation.66 The other, the International Convention Re-
laws of the territory in which the ship is registered" (art. III(3)), leaving enforce-
ment solely to the flag state of the offending ship. Other states may notify the flag state 
through diplomatic channels of evidence that an infraction has occurred, but, if the 
flag state fails to prosecute the violator, the only resort of the complaining state is to 
diplomatic protest or litigation in an international forum. 
The 1962 amendments in general permit states parties to extend the prohibited 
zones to a minim.um of 100 miles from their coasts; extend the convention's coverage 
to all tankers over 150 tons gross tonnage, and, so far as practicable, all other vessels of 
whatever size; and provide that new vessels over 20,000 tons built under contract after 
the convention comes into force shall be prohibited from discharging oil anywhere in 
the world. In addition, the 1962 conference adopted a resolution favoring the complete 
avoidance, as soon as practicable, of all discharges of persistent oils into the sea. 
The 1969 amendments will abolish the system of prohibited zones and, in principle, 
prohibit all oil discharges, except under conditions more stringent than those previously 
applicable. 
The convention has not proved very effective. See note 120 infra. For analysis and 
criticisms of the convention, see generally the articles cited in note 7 supra, and 3 
UNITED STATES COMMN. ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND REsouRCES, PANEL RE-
PORT: MARINE REsoURCES AND LEGAL-PRAcrICAL .ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT 
pt. VIII, at 81-90 (1969). 
65. See Final Act of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Dam-
age, 1969, (Nov. 28, 1969), and attached conventions. The conference was sponsored by 
IMCO and over forty nations participated. The two conventions are reprinted in 6-i 
AM. J. INTL. L. 471-90 (1970) and 1 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 367-87 (1970). In addi-
tion to the two conventions, the conference adopted two resolutions, on International 
Co-Operation Concerning Pollutants Other than Oil, and Establishment of an Inter-
national Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, reprinted in 64 AM. J. INTL. 
L. 398-400 (1970). On May 20, 1970, President Nixon asked Senate consent to ratification 
of both of the 1969 Brussels Conventions. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1970, at 1, col. 3; 62 
DEPT. STATE BULL. 756-57 (1970). 
66. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened 
for signature Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 481 (1970). The convention 
aims at ensuring that adequate compensation is available to persons who suffer oil 
pollution damage resulting from maritime casualties involving oil-carrying ships. The 
convention places the liability for any such damage caused within the territorial bound-
aries of a contracting state, including liability for the costs of any preventive measures 
taken and further loss or damage caused by such, preventive measures, on the owner 
of the ship from which the polluting oil escaped or was discharged. Subject to a num-
ber of specific exceptions, this liability of the owner is strict: it is the duty of the 
owner to prove in each case that any of the exceptions should in fact operate. However, 
except in cases in which the owner has been guilty of actual fault in respect of the inci-
dent, he may limit his liability in respect of any one incident to an aggregate sum of 
2,000 francs (approximately $134) for each ton of the ship's gross tonnage; but the 
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lating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties (the so-called "public law" convention), is more relevant 
to the contiguous-zone question in that it would permit parties to 
employ limited antipollution measures, such as bombing or towing, 
against vessels which were involved in maritime casualties on the 
high seas having the effect of creating "grave and imminent danger 
to their coastline or related interests" from oil pollution.67 However, 
this convention, like the private-law convention, is directed es-
sentially at remedial rather than preventive action. Moreover, it m:ay 
be inferred that the states participating in the Brussels Conference re-
garded the establishment of even this limited authority to act against 
pollution threats on the high seas as a highly exceptional measure. 
Not only did they consider the drafting of a special international 
agreement necessary for establishing the authority to take such ac-
owner's liability, where he is entitled to limit it, must not in any event exceed 210 
million francs (approximately $14 million) for each incident. 
The convention requires ships registered in states parties to it to maintain insur-
ance or other financial security in sums equivalent to the owner's total liability for one 
incident. These ships are required to carry certificates (issued by their flag state) evi-
dencing such insurance or other guarantee. Contracting states are required not to per-
mit ships under their flags to trade without insurance, and to ensure that vessels 
entering or leaving their harbors and other installations do carry insurance. 
Provisions determining the courts that are competent to exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of claims under the convention, the period within which claims must be 
brought, and the distribution of compensation money to victims are also included. 
The convention applies to al! tankers and other oil-carrying vessels, except that 
only ships carrying more than 2,000 tons of oil are required to maintain insurance in 
respect of oil pollution damage. The convention does not apply to warships or other 
ships owned or operated by a state and used temporarily for government noncommer-
cial service; but it does apply, in respect of the liability and jurisdiction provisions 
(but not the insurance requirements) to ships owned by a state and used for commer-
cial purposes. 
The convention will enter into force when eight states have become parties, includ-
ing five states each with not less than I million gross tons of tanker tonnage. 
67. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, opened for signature Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 64 AM. J. 
INTL. L. 471 (1970). Article 1(1) of the convention provides that states parties 
may take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate 
or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from 
pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a maritime 
casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to 
result in major harmful consequences. 
The convention stipulates the conditions under which, and the procedures through 
which such measures are to be taken, and imposes upon a state, which takes measures 
that go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the ends stated in the conven-
tion, the obligation to pay compensation for any damage resulting from such unjus-
tified action. There is provision for the settlement of disputes arising out of any 
measures purported to be taken under the convention. The parties involved in the 
dispute may either agree to settle it by negotiation or conciliation or, failing such 
agreement, by means of an arbitration procedure contained in an annex to the con-
vention. The convention applies to all sea-going vessels except warships or other ships 
owned or operated by a state and used temporarily on government noncommercial 
service. The convention will enter force when fifteen states have become parties. 
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tion, but they also carefully limited such authority to the most 
urgent cases, and circumscribed its exercise with detailed procedural 
requirements and provisions regarding liability. 
Nor can the Canadian position derive any clear support from 
international practice. There are, as the Canadian Government 
points out, a number of analogous cases in which states have asserted 
jurisdiction for various purposes, such as conservation of coastal 
fisheries or national security, 68 in a contiguous zone broader than 
twelve miles, and indeed there does seem to be a general trend to-
ward increasing coastal-state assertions of jurisdiction in such zones. 
However, there appear to be no precedents-in terms of practice 
by other states-directly supporting the Canadian assertion of so 
broad a contiguous zone for the specific purpose of pollution con-
trol.69 
In short, however persuasive the Canadian case may be in terms 
of what international law ought to be-and the Canadian arguments 
have considerable appeal in that regard-it is simply not persuasive 
in terms of what international law seems now to permit. The Cana-
dian Government's awareness of the weakness of its legal position 
with respect to the assertion of jurisdiction on a contiguous-zone 
theory is evident in its withdrawal of jurisdiction from the Inter-
national Court of Justice to deal with the issue. Indeed, on several 
occasions Prime Minister Trudeau conceded that the Court might 
well rule against Canada if the matter were submitted to it. For 
example, in explaining the Canadian reservation, the Prime Minister 
indicated that there was a "very grave risk that the world court 
would find itself obliged to find that coastal states cannot take steps 
to prevent pollution."70 The Canadian Government's essentially de-
68. See generally M. McDOUGAL 8e W. BURitE, supra note 53; Comment, Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial Sea, 44 WASH. L. R.Ev. 307 (1969); and notes 104-10 
infra. Canadian commentators have drawn particular analogy to the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, April 29, 
1958, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5980, 559 U.N.T.S. 286, to which twenty-eight 
states, including the United States but not Canada, are presently parties. The conven-
tion provides, inter alia, that "[a] coastal state has a special interest in the maintenance 
of the productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its 
territorial sea" (art. 6(1)) and may thus take the initiative in prescribing measures of 
conservation. Such measures, however, must be nondiscriminatory, based on appro-
priate scientific findings, and urgently needed. If negotiations with other states having 
an interest in the exploitation of the areas involved do not result in an agreement, 
any of these states may invoke the compulsory arbitration machinery set up by the 
convention. See generally Bishop, The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 62 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1206 (1962). 
69. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL 8e W. BURitE, supra note 53, at 848-49: "Very few states 
have sought protection from this type of [oil] pollution by extending authority to ocean 
areas beyond the territorial sea. There has rather been clear recognition of a need for 
inclusive prescription." 
70. Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 9. However, the Government bas 
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fensive posture with respect to its legal position is further apparent 
in its admission that by its unilateral action it is, in its view, breaking 
new ground and creating new law in this area.71 
The Canadian claim to sovereignty over at least substantial por-
tions of the waters of the Northwest Passage raises additional com-
plex questions of international law. Since some fifty-seven countries 
presently claim territorial seas of twelve miles or more,72 it seems 
extremely unlikely that any international tribunal would hold 
Canada's assertion of a twelve-mile limit to be contrary to interna-
tional law.78 As mentioned previously, this twelve-mile territorial 
sea in itself encloses several important straits in the Passage.74 With 
regard to the broader Canadian claim to the waters of the entire 
archipelago, international law provides few guidelines.75 Similar 
archipelagic claims by Indonesia and the Philippines have thus far 
won little international support.76 But Canada may make a respect-
able argument that the Arctic Archipelago is distinguishable from 
these other situations-in its geographic contours, its geologic con-
tinuity with the mainland, its unique often-frozen condition, and 
perhaps in its freedom from historic patterns of conflicting interests 
or use by other states.77 It is not clear how and where the baselines 
never conceded that the Act is in violation of international law; its position has rather 
been that there is an absence of international law clearly applicable to issues of ocean 
pollution in general and navigation in Arctic areas in particular. See, e.g., id. at IO; 
statement of Mr. Beesley, Head of Legal Division, Department of External Affairs, in 
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Before the House Standing Comm. on Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development Respecting Bill C-202, No. 15, at 15:7-13 (April 30, 
1970); and note 111 infra. 
71. See, e.g., Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 8, where he notes that 
"[o]ur pollution legislation is without question at the outer limits of international law: 
We are pressing against the frontier • • • .'' See generally text accompanying notes 
93.97 infra. 
72. The figure is from the Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 9. For a 
convenient recent compilation of national claims to territorial seas, see 8 INTL. LEGAL 
MATERIALS 516 (1969). 
73. Canada has stated its willingness to submit this issue to the International Court. 
Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 9. The United States Government has 
recently indicated that it would support a new law-of-the-sea treaty setting the breadth 
of the territorial sea at twelve miles, so long as there were guaranteed rights of free 
transit through and over international straits. See President Nixon's Statement on 
United States Policy for the Seabed, May 23, 1970, reprinted in 62 DEPT. STATE BULL. 
737-38 (1970); Secretary of State Rogers, The Rule of Law and the Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes, in 62 DEPT. STATE BuLL. 623, 624 (1970). 
74. See text accompanying note 18 supra. 
75. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL &: W. BURKE, supra note 53, at 418-19, where they com-
ment: "It is clear that no consensus has evolved for any particular system of delimiting 
the bounds of authority over the waters of archipelagic islands.'' See also Sorenson, 
The Territorial Sea of Archipelagoes, 6 NED. TIJDSCHRIFT vooR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 
(special issue) 315 (1959). 
76. See, e.g., 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 282-85 (1965). 
77. See Canadian Note, supra note 19, at 6028. The argument is developed by Head, 
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of such an archipelagic claim would be drawn,78 what the precise 
status of the waters enclosed would be, or how such an archipelagic 
claim may affect the drawing of shipping safety control zones under 
the new Pollution Prevention Act. The status of the archipelagic 
waters as either internal or territorial is important primarily in 
its relation to the right of innocent passage, which is generally ap-
plicable to territorial but not internal waters. 79 However, there are 
supra note 13, at 218-20. Several Canadian commentators have suggested that a Canadian 
archipelagic claim may be analogous to and supported by the International Court of 
Justice's treatment of the "skjaergaard" in the Norwegian Fisheries Case (United King-
dom v. Norway), (1951] I.C.J. 116. In that case the Court decided, inter alia, that the 
baseline for determining Norway's territorial sea should be established from certain 
base-points on the outer-most of the countless rocks and islands off the Norwegian 
coast (the "skjaergaard"), rather than, under the usual rule, from the low-water mark 
on its mainland. In reaching this decision, the Court took into account the geographic 
and geologic relation of the "skjaergaard" to the mainland. Article 4(1) of the Terri-
torial Sea Convention, supra note 54, reflects this decision by providing that the method 
of straight baselines may be employed in delimiting the territorial sea, inter alia, "if 
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity •••• " However, 
it seems questionable that the language itself could be read so broadly as to include 
so extensive a geographic entity as the Canadian Archipelago. See also Pharand, supra 
note 13, at 58, concluding that "any delimitation that closed off the Northwest Passage 
would be contrary to international law." 
78. The Government was not prepared to table maps of the zones and indicated 
that they would be defined only at a later date. Remarks of Mr. Chretien, ll4 H.C, 
DEB. 5940-41 (April 16, 1970). 
79. Article 14(1) of the Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 54, provides that "all 
States ••. shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea" and 
article 15(1) provides that coastal states must not hamper such passage. The conven-
tion distinguishes "territorial waters" from "internal waters"; under article 5(1), "waters 
on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal 
waters of the state." However, the right is subject to a number of limitations and 
ambiguities. Thus, article 14(4) defines passage as "innocent so long as it is not preju-
dicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal State," and article 16(1) 
provides that "[t]he coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to 
prevent passage which is not innocent." Under article 16(3), a state may suspend the 
right of innocent passage of merchant vessels in its territorial waters when necessary 
for its security. Moreover, article 17 provides that "foreign ships exercising the right 
of innocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal 
State in conformity with these articles and other rules of international law, and, in 
particular, with such laws and regulations relating to transport and navigation." It is 
relevant that the International Law Commission, in its commentary on the draft 
article on which article 17 was based, noted as examples of such laws and regulations, 
inter alia, those dealing with protection of the waters of the coastal state against pol-
lution of any kind caused by ships, and the conservation of the living resources of the 
sea. International Law Commn., Report, ll U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 20, U.N. Doc. 
A/3159 (1956). See 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 76, at 387. 
The exercise of the right within an archipelago is particularly unclear. Article 5(2) 
of the Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 54, provides that when the establishment 
of a straight baseline in accordance with article 4 (e.g., to enclose a fringe of islands) 
has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been con-
sidered part of the territorial sea or high sea, a right of innocent passage, as provided 
in articles 14-23, shall exist in these waters. Pointing out that the difference between 
internal and territorial waters is not so clear-cut as sometimes alleged, Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, commented: 
There is a school of thought, for example, that the status of the waters of the 
Arctic archipelago fall somewhere between the regime of internal waters and the 
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strong indications that the Canadian Government takes the position 
that oil-tanker passage, by virtue of its potential for pollution, is per 
se "noninnocent."80 I£ this characterization prevails, issues related 
to rights of innocent passage clearly become of little relevance. 
The question whether the Northwest Passage constitutes an "in-
ternational strait" for purposes of applying the right of innocent 
passage again has no clear answer. Article 16(4) of the Territorial 
· Sea Convention provides that "[t]here shall be no suspension of the 
innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for 
international navigation between one part of the high seas and an-
other part of the high seas"81 thus in effect confirming a similar right 
under customary international law recognized by the International 
Court in the Corfu Channel Case.82 In view of the extremely limited 
use of the Northwest Passage to date,83 the contention that the Pas-
sage is one "used for international navigation" or that it constitutes 
regime of the territorial sea. Certainly, Canada cannot accept any right of innocent 
passage if that right is defined as precluding the right of a coastal state to control 
pollution in such waters. The law may be undeveloped on this question, but if that 
1s the case, we propose to develop it. 
114 H.C. DEB. 6015 (April 17, 1970). See also Background Notes, supra note 3, at 3, 
which states: 
The Government intends to open up the Northwest Passage as a water-way for 
innocent passage by ships of all states, by laying down conditions for the exercise 
of such passage; by establishing that the passage of ships threatening pollution will 
not be considered innocent; by ensuring against the Northwest Passage becoming, 
through the process of customary usage, an uncontrolled international strait; and 
by adopting a functional and constructive approach which does not interfere with 
the activities of others and reflects the Government's responsibility to its own peo-
ple and [to] the international community to preserve the ecological balance of 
Canada and its marine environment. 
80. See statement of Mr. Beesley, Head of Legal Division, Department of External 
Affairs, on April 29, 1970, in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Before the House 
Standing Comm. on External Affairs and National Defence, No. 25, at 25:ll (April 29, 
1970): 
It is the Canadian position that any passage threatening the environment of a 
coastal state cannot be considered innocent since it represents a threat to the 
coastal state security. 
See also statements by Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, 
quoted in note 79 supra; and Background Notes, supra note 3, quoted in note 79 supra. 
81. Territorial Sea Convenfion, supra note 54, art. 16(4). Article 16(4) in effect limits 
the right of a coastal state to suspend innocent passage through such a strait for rea-
sons of security, as might othenvise be the case under article 16(1). The issue is sig-
nificant since Canada in part bases its claim to control of the Northwest Passage on 
grounds of "nationai security." 
82. (United Kingdom v. Albania) [1949] I.C.J. 4. The case arose out of damage done 
to several British warships in the Corfu Straits by mines which had been laid in the 
channel with the knowledge of the Albanian authorities. The case firmly established 
the principle that vessels of war, like merchant ships, were entitled to exercise the 
right of innocent passage through an international strait, at least in times of peace. 
The Court placed the Corfu Strait in the category of an "international highway" in 
view of its convenience for international navigation and the substantial use made of it 
for that purpose. 
83. There have been less than a dozen transits to date, none of which have been 
commercial. See Pharand, supra note 13, at 42-45. 
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an "international highway" so as to bring it within the scope of the 
doctrine of "international straits" is at least open to argument. 84 
Again, the practical significance of this issue seems to be diminished 
by the apparent Canadian position that it alone has the right to 
determine whether passage is in fact "innocent," and that tankers-
at least those not complying with Canadian regulations-may prop-
erly be denied the right of innocent pasage. 
Viewing the Pollution Prevention Act as a whole, it is interesting 
to speculate why the Canadian Government chose to assert jurisdic-
tion over the Northwest Passage on a highly controversial contig-
uous-pollution-zone theory when it might well have satisfied many 
of its stated objectives in a less vulnerable way. The American ob-
jection to Canada's extension of its territorial sea to twelve miles 
was pro forma, and, as indicated, 85 with this extension several of 
the principal straits making up the Passage are clearly subject to 
Canadian sovereignty. Thus, even without utilizing a contiguous-
zone theory, Canada would seem to have broad authority to establish 
reasonable pollution control regulations and requirements for all 
ships transiting such territorial straits, and thus, in effect, for all 
vessels utilizing the Passage. Indeed, even jurisdiction based on 
Canada's archipelagic claim outlined above86 seems less controversial 
than the contiguous-zone concept on which the Pollution Prevention 
Act is based. Of course, jurisdiction based on a territorial or archi-
pelagic theory would be geographically more limited than that based 
on a contiguous-zone approach and vessels might conceivably dis-
charge oil or otherwise act contrary to Canadian desires outside of 
84. The criterion for application of the "international straits" rule seems to be the 
channel's usefulness for international maritime traffic rather than the actual volume of 
use. In the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 428, the Court said: 
It may be asked whether the test is to be found in the volume of traffic passing 
through the strait or in its greater or lesser importance for navigation. But in the 
opinion of the court the decisive criteria is rather its geographical situation as con-
necting the two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for inter-
national navigation. 
In its draft article relating to this question, the International Law Commission pro-
posed that the "international straits" rule apply only if the strait was "normally" used 
for international navigation. See International Law Commn., Report, 11 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. 9, at 19-20, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). However, the Conference omitted the word 
"normally" (see text accompanying note 81 supra), indicating its unwillingness to 
adopt "extent of use" as a criterion for applicability of the rule. See 4 M. WHITEMAN, 
supra note 76, at 463-65. 
In the summer of 1967, the United States was unsuccessful in persuading the Soviet 
Union that Vilkitski Strait, connecting the Kara and Laptev Seas and part of the 
"Northeast Passage," was an international strait, requiring the grant of innocent pas-
sage to the United States Coast Guard icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind, which were 
then attempting a circumnavigation of the Arctic Ocean. See Pharand, Soviet Union 
Warns United States Against Use of Northeast Passage, 62 AM. J. INTL. L. 927 (1968); 
Bilder, Emerging Legal Problems of the Deep Seas and Polar Regions, 20 NAVAL WAR 
COLL. R.Ev. 34, 38-39 (1967). 
85. See text accompanying note 18 supra. 
86. See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
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territorial straits or the archipelago. Moreover, a more traditional 
approach would do little to solve the problem of ship-caused pollu-
tion of Canada's east and west coasts, where straits and islands are 
lacking; if Canada wished to control high-seas pollution off those 
coasts, it could do so only on some broader pollution zone theory. 
The Canadian Government may have seen the unique and par-
ticularly appealing Arctic situation as providing a relatively favor-
able context for the introduction of the new pollution zone theory. 
The Arctic experience could then later be used as a precedent for 
application of the theory on the east and west coasts.87 
It is also interesting to conjecture why the Canadian Government 
chose to act unilaterally rather than to await international action as 
the United States requested. The introduction of the Canadian legis-
lation clearly had already served a purpose in spurring the United 
States to a commitment to seek rapid international agreement on 
problems of Arctic pollution, and the practical problem created by 
tanker transit through the Passage is, at the very least, several years 
in the future.88 Canada could presumably have deferred approval of 
the Act pending the results of the international conference called 
by the United States. 
Government statements and parliamentary debates suggest that 
the answer lies in good part in an increasing and profound Canadian 
disillusionment and frustration with international processes con-
cerning the law of the sea, based, inter alia, on Canada's experience 
with the defeat of many of its principal proposals at the Geneva Law 
of the Sea Conferences of 1958 and 1960 and the Brussels Marine 
87. While the present Pollution Prevention Act applies only to Canada's Arctic 
coasts, the Government has indicated that it will introduce legislation to protect against 
pollution of Canada's east and west coasts as well. See reply by Minister of Transport, 
the Hon. Donald Jamieson, to question by Mr. Barnett, II4 D.C. DEB. 5893 (April 15, 
1970). See also remarks of Mr. Chretien, id. 5938 (April 16, 1970), and Background 
Notes, supra note 3, at 3-4. One of the stated purposes of the territorial-sea bill in 
providing a twelve-mile territorial sea (see note 2 supra and accompanying text) was to 
"provide the comprehensive jurisdictional basis which Canada requires to enforce 
anti-pollution controls outside Arctic waters off Canada's east and west coasts •••• " 
114 H.C. DEB. 6012 (April 17, 1970) (remarks of External Affairs Minister, Mitchell 
Sharp). 
88. Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1969, at 8, cols. 2-3. The method of transporting Alaskan 
North Slope oil to the east coast in still unsettled. Various schemes other than use of 
the Northwest Passage have been proposed, including construction of a pipeline directly 
from the North Slope to the American Midwest or from the Puget Sound area of 
Washington to the Midwest. A consortium of oil companies is already committed to 
constructing a pipeline across Alaska from Prudhoe Bay to the ice-free port of Valdez, 
on the Gulf of Alaska, from which oil may be shipped by conventional tankers to the 
west coast of the United States. Estimates of comparative costs and benefits of the 
different schemes apparently still are inconclusive. Id. A recent report indicates that 
the Humble Oil &: Refining Co., chief financial backer of the S.S. Manhattan ice-break-
ing-tanker studies, has at least temporarily suspended those studies and shelved its 
plans for tra.'lsporting oil in tankers through the Northwest Passage, in order to 
concentrate on pipeline alternatives. Id., Oct. 22, 1970, at 14, cols. 3-4. 
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Pollution Conference of 1969.89 Official statements reflect the Cana-
dian Government's view that international discussion would, at a 
minimum, produce considerable delay and might ultimately result 
in what seemed to be simply another sacrifice of coastal-state in-
terests to those of ship-owning states.90 Internal politics and na-
tionalistic pressures-perhaps a desire by the Liberal government 
to establish its independence from American policy-may also have 
played a role in the Canadian decision to forego reliance on tradi-
tional international law processes.91 Finally, the Government may 
well have seen as its best strategy to confront the United States and 
other nations with a fait accompli92 as quickly as possible, before 
89. See, e.g., Canadian Note, supra note 19, at 6027-28. 
On the Geneva Law of the Sea Conferences, see generally 4 M. 'WHITEMAN, supra 
note 76, at 79-137; Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was 
Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INTL. L. 607 (1958); Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on 
the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INTL. L. 751 (1960). 
For some of the Canadian proposals at the two conferences, see 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra 
note 76, at 95-97, 124, 133. 
At the 1969 Brussels Conference, Canada objected to the conventions on the grounds, 
inter alia, that they failed to permit sufficient prior control to prevent accidents from 
occurring; that liability in the private-law convention was placed at too low a figure 
and should be placed on the cargo-owner as well as the ship-owner; and that financial 
reparation under the private-law convention extended only to pollution damage 
inflicted within territorial limits and did not include damage caused to fishing interests 
in contiguous areas. See references cited in Hardy, International Control of Marine 
Pollution, at 33 n.63a (to be published in the spring of 1971 in the National Resources 
Journal). See generally statement by Minister of Transport, the Hon. Donald Jamieson, 
114 H.C. DEB. 2698-700 Gan. 22, 1970); remarks by Mr. Rowland, id. 7903 Gune 9, 
1970). Canada cast the only vote against the private-law convention and abstained on 
the public-law convention. 
90. Among the many expressions of this attitude, see, e.g., Prime Minister Tru-
deau's comment that "We have no reason to believe that such a[n effective international] 
regime can be expected within the next few months, or even years," Prime Minister's 
Press Speech, supra note 3, at 8; External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp's comment 
that "Canada has tested the climate for international action against pollution, and 
... the climate has been found seriously wanting," 114 H.C. DEB. 5951 (April 16, 
1970); and the remarks of Mr. St. Pierre: 
We tried in 1958. We tried in 1960. We tried last fall at the IMCO meeting in 
Brussels. Time and time again we have been faced with the fact that international 
sea law is primarily made by shipping nations for shippers and that the rights of 
the third parties, the coastal states, are not sufficiently recognized. 
114 H.C. DEB. 5964 (April 16, 1970). See also Minister Sharp's remarks at 114 H.C. DEB. 
5949-50 (April 16, 1970), and, questioning the sincerity of United States' appeals for 
multilateral action, at 114 H.C. DEB. 6013 (April 17, 1970). In the Statement by Pro-
fessors of International Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, on the 
Canadian Initiative To Establish a Maritime Zone for Environmental Protection: Its 
Significance for the Multilateral Development of International Law, Presented at the 
Annual Conference of the American Society of International Law, New York City, 
April 24, 1970, at 8-9 [hereinafter University of Toronto Statement], the authors (Pro-
fessors R. St. J. MacDonald, Gerald L. Morris, and Douglas M. Johnston) indicate a 
lack of faith in the ability of IMCO, as an agency reflecting primarily the interests of 
the major flag states, to deal adequately with ocean pollution problems. 
91. However, Prime Minister Trudeau expressly denied that the measure was 
"jingoistic" or anti-American. Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 9. 
92. The Canadian action was in this sense similar to its successful unilateral action 
in 1964 establishing a twelve-mile fishing zone (Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act 
of 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 4(1) (Can.)), which was at first protested but subsequently 
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strong international counter-pressures could be mobilized. This 
course of action would at least have the effect of forcing more prompt 
international action and might strengthen Canada's hand at any in-
ternational negotiations which might ensue. Moreover, if Canada 
agreed to the American request, if the results of such negotiations 
eventually proved unsatisfactory to Canada, and if it only then took 
unilateral action by adopting legislation such as the Pollution Pre-
vention Act-possibly by that time in the face of strongly contrary 
international opinion expressed at the negotiations-the Canadian 
position might be considerably weakened. On the other hand, in 
view of Canada's refusal to delay passage of the Act, its many allega-
tions of commitment to the concept of internationally agreed mea-
sures ring somewhat hollow. Unless Canada is prepared to rescind or 
limit the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, there seems to be 
relatively little left for an international conference to negotiate con-
cerning Arctic pollution. 
Certain aspects of the Canadian position are illustrative of the 
workings of the international legal process. Particularly interesting 
in this regard is the Canadian attempt to characterize its unilateral 
action as a positive and praiseworthy contribution to international 
law-in the words of some of its proponents, "a current initiative 
of striking importance and relevance in the context of the dynamic, 
creative development of international law."93 Pointing out the 
accepted role of state practice in the development of customary in-
ternational law, and noting the many examples of unilateral action 
leading to the development of law-such as the 1945 Truman pro-
clamation of jurisdiction over the continental shelf,94 Canada's 1964 
legislation unilaterally establishing exclusive fishing zones,95 and the 
gradual extension by unilateral state action of the territorial sea 
beyond three miles96-Canadian spokesmen have sought to portray 
imitated by the United States. This unilateral action was likewise defended by the 
Canadians as a response to the failure to achieve international agreements, necessary 
to protect Canadian resources, and justified by the impetus such action might give to 
effective negotiations; and it likewise threatened serious conflicts with the United 
States. See the extracts from parliamentary debates on that occasion quoted in 
J. CAST.EL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 790-94 (1965). See generally Gotlieb, The Canadian 
Contribution to the Concept of a Fishing Zone in International Law, 2 CAN. YB. INTL. L. 
55 (1964). 
93. University of Toronto Statement, supra note 90, at I. 
94. Proclamation No. 2667, IO Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945). The American action was 
widely copied by other states and led eventually to the 1958 Continental Shelf Con-
vention, supra note 16, and the 1969 decision of the International Court in the North 
Seas Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, recognizing the doctrine as a principle of 
customary international law. 
95. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act of 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 22 (Can.). Again, 
the contiguous-fishing-zone concept has been widely copied. 
96. Compare, for example, the 1960 table of state claims respecting marginal seas 
prepared by the United Nations Secretariat and reprinted in 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra 
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the new legislation as a demonstration of Canada's commitment to, 
rather than departure from, the principle of respect for international 
law.07 
It is indeed well accepted that state practice is an important com-
ponent in the development of international law. However, the argu-
ment that unilateral action, especially action contrary to accepted 
norms, is therefore somehow justified and appropriate-perhaps 
even as a matter of international duty-is not convincing and raises 
troublesome questions. Clearly, every state acting contrary to ac-
cepted law could so justify its position. An argument along these 
lines might have been more persuasive in the context, for example, 
of the Truman proclamation on the continental shelf,98 when rele-
vant international law was undeveloped and international arrange-
ments for dealing with such questions were less common or less 
readily available. But, despite Canada's suggestions to the con-
trary, 99 the Canadian action is not ·written on a clean slate. Instead, 
it appears to be contrary to relatively clear and well-established 
international rules, and occurs in a context in which international 
institutions and procedures are readily available to discuss possible 
changes in such rules. There is considerable weight in Canada's argu-
ments that the existing rules are inadequate and obsolete; but the 
alleged obsolescence of international rules has never, in itself, been 
regarded as a valid legal excuse for their violation. 
In this respect, the Canadian position illustrates a recurrent 
dilemma inherent in the comparative inflexibility of the modern 
international legal process-the problem of establishing viable and 
orderly processes of legal change through which smaller states can 
effectively, within the legal system, work to develop law that is 
responsive to their needs despite the intransigence of larger powers. 
When states such as Canada perceive collective international pro-
note 76, at 19-35, with compilations for subsequent years such as those reprinted in 
2 !NTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 1122 (1963), and 8 id. 516, 519-39 (1969). 
97. See, e.g., Canadian Note, supra note 19, at 6027; the Prime Minister's Press 
Speech, supra note 3, at 9, where he states that "we have acted as we have because of 
necessity, but also because of our awareness of the impetus given to the development 
of international law by individual state practice"; the remarks of Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, that "[t]he bill we have introduced 
should be regarded as a stepping stone toward the elaboration of an international legal 
order which will protect and preserve this planet ••. ", 114 H.C. DEB. 5949 (April 16, 
1970), and that "[w]e are • . • determined to act as pioneers in pushing back the 
frontiers of international law ••• ", id. 5951; .and the remark of Mr. Allmand that 
"what we had done actually was a spur to the development of international law in 
connection with pollution control. I firmly believe that by introducing and passing 
these bills we shall be developing international law relating to pollution." 114 H.C. 
DEB. 5997 (April 17, 1970). 
98. See note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., notes 111 & 115 infra. 
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cesses as unlikely in practice to protect what they regard as vital 
interests, they may see no viable alternative to unilateral action, 
whatever the consequences such action may produce for the existing 
legal system.100 And indeed, as Canada points out, such unilateral 
actions, if imitated by many other states as well, may ultimately lead 
to the gradual jelling of consensus on new rules. But the clumsiness 
of such a process of legal change and the strains it produces on the 
legal order are evident. 
Canada's extensive reliance on American practice in defense of 
its action is also significant.101 The Canadian Government and par-
liamentarians cited as precedents for the Act such unilateral Amer-
ican assertions of jurisdiction beyond its territorial waters as the 
Truman continental-shelf1°2 and fisheries103 proclamations, customs-
enforcement practices,104 Air Defense Identification Zones,105 the 
establishment by the United States of an exclusive twelve-mile fish-
eries zone106 tafter strong objection to Canada's prior establishment 
of such a zone), high-seas atomic tests,107 and the Cuban missile 
quarantine.108 Moreover, the Canadian Government pointed out 
100. See, e.g., the comment in University of Toronto Statement, supra note 90, at 
1-2, that the Canadian legislation "exemplifies the unavoidable resort to unilateral 
action by a national government faced by the inability of the international community 
to remedy a critical situation affecting its essential interests." 
101. See, e.g., Canadian Note, supra note 19, at 6027. 
102. See note 94 supra. 
103. Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (1945); 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 
76, at 945-62. The proclamation stated that the United States would regard it 
proper to establish conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the 
coasts of the United States wherein fishing attivities have been, or in the future may 
be, developed on an international scale. The United States would unilaterally regulate 
such activities in zones where only its nationals were involved and would do so by 
agreement where nationals of other states were involved. 
104. See, e.g., the Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, ch. 438, 49 Stat. 517, as amended, 19 
U.S.C. §§ 1701-11 (1964), discussed in Jessup, The Anti-Smuggling A.ct of 1935, 31 AM. 
J. INTL. L. 101 (1937). 
105. The United States (since 1940) and also Canada (since 1951) have promulgated 
regulations establishing Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), extending at some 
points several hundred miles over the high seas. Foreign aircraft entering such zones 
are required to file flight plans and to make periodic position reports. The American 
regulation appears to be applicable to foreign aircraft only if they are bound for the 
United States. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.1-.49 (1970); 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 76, at 
496-97. The American zones were specifically referred to in remarks by Mr. Douglas, 
114 H.C. DEB. 5944-45 (April 16, 1970), and Mr. St. Pierre, id. 5965. 
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
107. Compare McDougal and Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: 
Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955), with Margolis, The Hydrogen 
Bomb Experiments and International Law, id. at 629. Such tests by the United States 
on or under the high seas are now prohibited by the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
108. See, e.g., Christo! and Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of 
Offensive Weapons and Associated Materiel to Cuba, 1962, 57 AM. J. INTL. L. 525 (1963). 
The quarantine was specifically referred to in remarks by Mr. Nielsen, 114 H.C. DEB. 
6003 (April 17, 1970), and Mr. Baldwin, id. 7897 ijune 9, 1970). 
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that any American criticism of the Canadian withdrawal of jurisdic-
tion over the pollution control and fisheries issues from the Inter-
national Court could only be regarded as highly hypocritical in view 
of the United States' own much broader "Connally reservation"100 
to the jurisdiction of that Court. The vulnerability of the United 
States to these arguments serves to illustrate the potential mirror 
effect of national decisions in the international legal arena; a state 
is in no position to complain if other states imitate its actions. Na-
tional policy should consequently take account of these precedential 
effects of unilateral actions, recognizing that each state by its own 
decisions-and more particularly, a great power such as the United 
States-helps define the type of world order in which it must itself 
henceforth live. Indeed, international law most appropriately enters 
into the national decision-making processes as a reminder of the 
long-run national interest in the existence of a credible system of 
international rules-an important policy objective which might 
otherwise be ignored under domestic pressures to achieve a short-run 
and ephemeral national advantage. 
Finally, Canada's refusal to permit the International Court to 
rule upon its dispute with the United States regarding the pollution 
control and fisheries questions serves to demonstrate the limitations 
of international adjudicative processes and suggests some of the 
reasons for those limitations.110 The Canadians were not prepared 
to risk losing a case in which they felt their vital interests were 
involved. Under existing international law their case was at best 
questionable. Moreover, they apparently viewed the Court as having 
an inherently conservative and legalistic bias; that is, as unlikely to 
approach the matter creatively or with sufficient :flexibility to take 
109. Canadian Note, supra note 19, at 6029. For other more pointed comments to 
this effect, see remarks of Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Mitchell 
Sharp, 114 H.C. DEB. 5949 (April 16, 1970), and of Mr. Douglas, id. 5945. 
The Connally Amendment consists of certain language in the United States' accep• 
tance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court under the "optional 
clause" of the Statute of the Court (art. 36(2)) by which the United States reserved such 
acceptance concerning "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United 
States of America" (emphasis added). 61 Stat. 1218 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1598, reprinted 
in 15 DEPT. STATE BuLL. 452 (1946). This "self-judging" reservation has been much 
criticized. Since the Canadian acceptance of the "optional clause" is on terms of reci• 
procity, it could presumably, in any event--even in the absence of its newly filed reserva• 
tion-have invoked the American reservation as a bar to any attempt by the United 
States to bring it before the Court under the "optional clause." See Case of Certain 
Nonvegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. 9. 
110. See generally C. JENKS, THE PROSPEC'rS FOR INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1964); 
L. BLOOMFIELD, LAW, Pouncs AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (International Conciliation 
Pamphlet No. 516, 1958); and J. STONE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND WORLD CRISIS 
(id. No. 536, 1962). 
November 1970] Canadian Pollution Prevention Act 29 
into account relatively new and emerging national interests such as 
concern with pollution. Drawing a distinction between Canada's 
willingness to submit its extension of the territorial sea to interna-
tional adjudication, and its unwillingness to so submit its pollution 
control legislation, Prime Minister Trudeau commented: 
There is ... no novelty in 12 miles; there is no new legal concept 
involved. There are differences of opinion but Canada is neverthe-
less prepared to have the territorial sea legislation adjudicated upon 
by international tribunals. We are content to do so in this instance 
because there is a body of law and practice upon which a court can 
base its decision. Such is not the case, however, with the concept of 
pollution control. There is as yet little law and virtually no practice 
in this area. 
It is for that reason that we are not prepared in this matter of 
vital importance to risk a setback. Make no mistake. Involved here 
is not simply a matter of Canada losing a case in the World Court-
that is one of the prices that we have long willingly paid as part of 
our adherence to an international rule of law. What is involved, 
rather, is the very grave risk that the "\,Vorld Court would find itself 
obliged to find that coastal states cannot take steps to prevent pollu-
tion. Such a legalistic decison would set back immeasurably the 
development of law in this critical area. 
In short, where we have extended our sovereignty, we are pre-
pared to go to court. On the other hand, where we are only at-
tempting to control pollution, we will not go to court until such 
time as the law catches up with technology.111 
111. Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 9. See also the Prime Minister's 
explanation to Parliament of Canada's filing of the new reservation: 
Canada is not prepared however to engage in litigation with other states concerning 
vital issues where the law is either inadequate or non-existent and thus does not 
provide a firm basis for judicial decision. . . • 
It is well known that there is little or no environmental law on the international 
plane and that the law now in existence favours the interests of the shipping states 
and the shipping owners engaged in the large scale carriage of oil and other po-
tential pollutants. 
114 H.C. DEB. 5624 (April 8, 1970). See also the comment of External Affairs Minister, 
Mitchell Sharp: 
Where the law is deficient any action undertaken to remedy its deficiencies can-
not properly be judged by the existing standards of that law. Such a proceeding 
would effectively block any possibility of reform. Canada remains firmly attached 
to the rule of law in international affairs and has the highest respect for the Inter-
national Court of Justice and the part it plays in the maintenance of the rule of 
law. At the same time, however, we are not prepared to litigate with other states 
on vital issues concerning which the law is either inadequate, non-existent, or 
irrelevant to the kind of situation Canada faces, as in the case of the Arctic. It 
is no service to the court or to the development of international law to attempt 
to resolve by adjudication questions on which the law does not provide a firm basis 
for decision. 
114 H.C. DEB. 5952 (April 16, 1970). 
The Prime Minister's explanation elicited some criticism. E.g., the remark of Mr. 
Lewis: "What nonsense it is to say, 'Canada strongly supports the rule of law in inter-
national affairs' when in the next breath he says he does not intend to be bound by it. 
We should stop this hypocrisy in international affairs." 114 H.C. DEB. 5625 (April 8, 
1970). 
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It may be too early to attempt to pass ultimate judgment on the 
Canadian action, but some tentative conclusions might be ventured. 
Undoubtedly, the Pollution Prevention Act will encounter wide crit-
icism. First, the Act appears to be, on its face, inconsistent with the 
existing international law of the sea. Also, Canada's decision to act 
unilaterally does not buoy hopes for the orderly development of in-
ternational law through collective international processes. Finally, 
the precedents established by the Act are clearly capable of wide-
spread abuse by other, perhaps less responsible states, with potentially 
harmful consequences for traditional principles of freedom of the 
seas. If a nation of the international stature of Canada may establish 
a 100-mile contiguous zone to control pollution, other coastal states 
may also seek to do so; and the range of regulation justified under 
the rubric of pollution control may in practice differ little from that 
asserted under claims of sovereignty over such zones. Moreover, if 
100-mile contiguous zones can be established for pollution control 
purposes, why not for other purposes as well. Canada's legal charac-
terization of its action as being justified under principles of "self-
defense" is particularly troublesome and capable of introducing 
new uncertainties into this already murky area of international law. 
Similarly, Canada's suggestion that tankers may enjoy only some 
attenuated right of innocent passage adds to already existing con-
fusion concerning the meaning of that concept, and could lead to 
further constrictions on innocent passage as an important principle 
of the law of the sea. Indeed, there is much to suggest that the 
American concern over Canada's action, and its strong diplomatic 
response, arose more from fears of these potentially harmful prec-
edential effects on the international legal order than from specific 
objection to Canadian control of the Northwest Passage.112 Viewed 
in this light, the Pollution Prevention Act weakens international law 
and is another significant step in the process of erosion of the prin-
ciple of freedom of the seas-a process that has been continuing 
since 1945. 
On the other hand, the Canadian action cannot simply be dis-
missed as irresponsible, nor can the real pressures it reveals be ig-
nored. Canada's sincere commitment and many contributions to 
international law and processes have been widely recognized and are 
in many respects outstanding. Its concern with the problem of Arctic 
pollution seems justified and its frustration with the slow pace and 
112. See Dept. of State Press Rel. No. 121 (April 15, 1970), quoted in text accom-
panying note 48 supra. 
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uncertain results of international action is understandable. As the 
Canadians point out, after almost fifty years of international discus-
sion of maritime oil pollution problems, including the recent 1969 
Brussels Conference, very little has been accomplished actually to 
prevent such pollution.113 Canada's view that the development of the 
law of the sea has been dominated by ship-mvning nations, and has 
tended to reflect primarily their interests rather than coastal-state 
interests, also seems historically correct; efforts to deal with ship-
caused ocean pollution are certain to continue to encounter powerful 
resistance. Finally, the contiguous-zone concept implies international 
acceptance of the legitimacy of coastal-state action on the high seas 
when such action is necessary to protect certain generally recognized 
special coastal-state interests. This functional principle of coastal-
state jurisdiction having once been accepted, its limitation to par-
ticular historically established interests or to a uniform zonal breadth 
becomes difficult to maintain; the principle should presumably be 
capable of embracing newly developing coastal-state interests and the 
zone encompassed should be defined by what is necessary in a prac-
tical sense to protect each such special interest, taking account also of 
the reasonable interests of other states.114 Thus, while the twelve-mile 
limitation may have been ample to deal with more traditional coastal-
state problems, it has become increasingly obvious that it may not 
be possible to meet legitimate pollution prevention interests within 
so narrow a zone-at least in the absence of more effective interna-
tional antipollution measures. So viewed, Canada's Pollution Pre-
vention Act demonstrates not its lack of commitment to international 
llll. See Prime Minister's Press Speech, supra note 3, at 6-7, quoting from Kennan, 
To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 401 (1970), to the effect 
that oil spillage into the oceans is estimated at a million tons per year, is steadily in-
creasing, and effective measures to deal with this problem have not been forthcoming. 
The failure of the international community to deal with oil pollution problems was 
emphasized in remarks by Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Mitchell 
Sharp, 114 H.C. DEB. 5949 (April 16, 1970), Mr. Douglas, id. 5945, and Mr. Murphy, 
id. 6006-07 (April 17, 1970). 
114. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 53, at 849, seem to suggest that general 
community policies would support such an extension of jurisdiction: 
Since the impact of pollution is usually upon coastal residents, the coastal state 
has an understandable interest in preventing the discharge of oil and other sub-
stances in such a way that harmful pollution results. If it were practicable for the 
coastal state to enact and enforce prohibitory regulations applicable in adjacent 
seas, there would seem to be sufficient justification for considering this permissible 
under general community policy. To the extent, therefore, that a coastal state 
could exercise sufficient effective control, it would be appropriate to J>ermit it to 
prohibit the discharge of oil that would, or could reasonably be thought to, dam-
age marine life and property in the vicinity. 
See also the interesting discussion in L. HYDEMAN & w. BERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CON-
TROL OF NUCLEAR MARITIME AcnvITIES ch. 7, at 236-40 (1960). 
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law, but rather the continued failure of that law, and of international 
institutions and processes generally, to meet real and pressing coastal-
state needs.115 
In the final analysis, an assessment of Canada's actions may de-
pend, in large part, upon the optimism or pessimism with which one 
views the international legal system and its capacity to respond 
promptly and effectively to new challenges. There are hopeful signs 
of increased responsiveness. Canada's dissatisfaction with the existing 
state of law of the sea reflects a broader international recognition of 
its deficiencies, and there is a prospect that the law of the sea may 
soon undergo substantial revision.116 Similarly, Canada's concern 
115. This attitude was summarized by Secretary of State for External Affairs, the 
Hon. Mitchell Sharp, as follows: 
The pioneering venture upon which we are embarked is a measure of our 
serious concern at the failure of international law to keep pace with technology, to 
adapt itself to special situations, and in particular to recognize the right of a coastal 
state to protect itself against the dangers of marine pollution. 
Existing international law is either inadequate or non-existent in this respect. 
Such law as does exist .•. is largely based on the principle of freedom of naviga-
tion, and is designed to protect the interests of states directly or indirectly involved 
with the maritime carriage of oil and other hazardous cargoes. 
A new "victim-oriented" law must be created to protect the marine environment 
and those rights and interests of the coastal state which are endangered by the 
threat to that environment. The Arctic waters bill is intended to advance the 
development of such new law. It is based on the fundamental principle of self-
defence •••• 
114 H C. DEB. 5951 (April 16, 1970). See also remarks of Minister Sharp, 114 H.C. DEB. 
5951 (April 16, 1970); Mr. St. Pierre, id. 5963-64; Mr. Douglas, id. 5945; and Mr. 
Allmand, id. 5997-98 (April 17, 1970). 
116. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2574 (XX.IV) (Dec. 15, 1969), requesting the Secretary-General 
to ascertain the views of member states on the desirability of convening at an early date 
a conference on the law of the sea to review the regimes of the high seas, the continental 
shelf, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living 
resources of the high seas-particularly in order to arrive at a clear, precise, and 
internationally accepted definition of the area of the seabed and ocean floor which 
lies beyond national jurisdiction, in the light of the international regime to be 
established for that area-and to report on the results of his consultations to the 
General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session. In a note of June 12, 1970, from the 
Secretary of State to the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States endorsed 
the idea of such a conference or conferences, noting, inter alia, the United States 
Government's conviction "that the protection of the environment, and particularly 
the prevention of pollution, must occupy a major role in the further development of 
the international law of the sea." 63 DEPT. STATE BULL. 38, 39 (1970). 
See also President Nixon's Statement on United States Policy for the Seabed, May 
23, 1970, reprinted in 62 DEPT. STATE BULL. 737-38 (1970). The statement proposed that 
all nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty under which they would renounce all 
national claims to the natural resources of the seabed beyond the point where the 
high seas reach a depth of 200 meters and would agree to regard these resources as 
the common heritage of mankind, whose exploitation was subject to an international 
regime. It also indicated that the United States was currently engaged with other states 
in an effort to obtain a new law-of-the-sea treaty which would establish a twelve-mile 
limit for territorial seas and provide for free transit through international straits, and 
would also accommodate the problems of developing countries and other nations 
regarding the conservation and use of the living resources of the sea. The President's 
comments at the beginning of his statement have broad relevance to the problems 
discussed in this Article: 
The nations of the world are now facing decisions of momentous importance 
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with pollution problems is but one manifestation of increasing world-
wide concern with environmental issues.117 Ocean pollution prob-
lems have received particular attention by international bodies and 
various proposals for international action have been advanced.118 
to man's use of the oceans for decades ahead. At issue is whether the oceans will 
be used rationally and equitably and for the benefit of mankind or whether they 
will become an arena of unrestrained exploitation and conflicting jurisdictional 
claims in which even the most advantaged states will be losers. 
The issue arises now-and with urgency-because nations have grown increas-
ingly conscious of the wealth to be exploited from the seabeds and throughout 
the waters above, and because they are also becoming apprehensive about ecological 
hazards of unregulated use of the oceans and seabeds. The stark fact is that 
the law of the sea is inadequate to meet the needs of modem technology and the 
concerns of the international community. If it is not modernized multilaterally, 
unilateral action and international conflict are inevitable. 
This is the time, then, for all nations to set about resolving the basic issues of 
the future regime for the oceans •••• 
117. See, e.g., among the many current discussions, U.N. Secretary-General, Report 
on Problems of the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. E/4667 (1969); Kennan, To Prevent 
a World Wasteland: A. Proposal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 401 (1970); Ritchie-Calder, 
Mortgaging the Old Homestead, id. at 207; and Wolman, Pollution as an International 
Issue, 47 id. 164 (1968). 
Implementing this general concern, the United Nations General Assembly decided 
in December 1968 to hold a United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
which will convene in 1972 in Stockholm. See G.A. Res. 2398, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, 
at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). See also G.A. Res. 2581 (XXIV) Gan, 8, 1970). 
ll8. See generally references cited in notes 6 &: 7 supra; Hardy, supra note 89. 
For a popular discussion of general ocean environmental problems, see W. MARX, THE 
FRAIL OCEAN (1967). 
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted several resolutions dealing with 
marine pollution. The most recent is G.A. Res. 2566 (XXIV) Gan. 12, 1970), on Promot• 
ing Effective Measures for the Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution, which requests 
the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the specialized agencies and intergovernmen-
tal organizations concerned, to complement reports and studies under preparation, with 
special reference to the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, by (I) a review of harmful chemical substances, radioactive materials, and other 
noxious agents and wastes which may dangerously affect man's health and his economic 
and cultural activities in the marine environment and coastal area; (2) a review of 
national activities and activities of specialized agencies and intergovernmental or-
ganizations dealing with the prevention and control of marine pollution including 
suggestions for more comprehensive action and improved coordination in this field; 
and (3) seeking the views of member states on the desirability and feasibility of an 
international treaty or treaties on the subject. See also G.A. Res. 2467B, 23 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. 18, at 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968), on prevention of marine pollution which 
might result from exploration and exploitation of the resources of the seabed and 
ocean floor; and G.A. Res. 2414, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 30-31, U.N. Doc. A/7218 
(1968), requesting the Secretary-General to report on progress achieved in promoting 
effective international agreements on the prevention and control of marine pollution. 
The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Assembly has 
recently called for a variety of measures to combat ocean pollution and has decided to 
convene an International Conference on Marine Pollution in 1973 "for the purpose of 
preparing a suitable international agreement for placing restraints on the contamination 
of the sea, land and air by ships, vessels and other equipment operating in the marine 
environment ••• .'' IMCO Ass. Res. A.176 (VI) (Oct. 21, 1969). IMCO is also working 
on pollution problems through its Maritime Safety Committee and Subcommittee on 
Pollution. 
A number of governmental and nongovernmental international organizations are 
also undertaking major monitoring and surveillance efforts to learn more concerning 
the precise causes, scope, and effects of ocean pollution and the impact of specific 
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Yet, while the need for effective regulation of ocean pollution is 
broadly conceded, each of the possible choices for a comprehensive 
regulatory regime poses difficulties. Regulation by the flag state of the 
ship concerned-the method sanctioned by traditional laissez faire 
concepts of freedom of the seas and adopted in the Oil Pollution 
Convention119-has thus far proved ineffective, and suggestions for 
simply strengthening existing proscriptions may prove of limited 
usefulness; enforcement procedures are clumsy and flag states have 
had little incentive to enforce antipollution rules outside their own 
territorial seas.120 On the other hand, regulation of ocean pollution 
by coastal states in broad contiguous zones outside their territorial 
seas, along the lines of the Canadian Act, raises problems already 
discussed; such extensions further undermine traditional concepts 
of freedom of navigation, are capable of abuse, and, in any event, 
cannot control pollution which enters the ocean far from a nation's 
coasts but which may nevertheless ultimately affect it. Proposals for 
regulation by either new or existing international agencies, which 
would be vested with some type of enforcement powers, raise com-
plex practical questions, as well as broader political issues, and it is 
doubtful that the major ship-owning powers will presently support 
such far-reaching proposals.121 Thus, agreement on some widely ac-
pollutants. Particularly noteworthy are the work of the Intergovernmental Ocean-
ographic Commission (IOC), which has recently proposed and is helping to implement 
the Long-term and Expanded Program of Oceanographic Research (LEPOR); the work 
of the Joint IMCO/FAO/UNESCO/WMO Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects 
of Marine Pollution (GESAMP); and the work of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), which in December 1970 will hold a Technical Conference on Marine 
Pollution and Its Effects on Living Resources and Fishing. 
119. See note 61 and text accompanying note 64 supra. 
120. For criticisms of the Oil Pollution Convention, see generally the references 
cited in note 7 supra, and :Biiiis, Revision of the International Convention on Oil 
Pollution, in ROME PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 281. Among these criticisms are the 
limited number of states presently bound by the convention; the practical difficulty of 
policing, detecting, and proving violations by ships in the vast seas areas covered; and 
the uncertainties of effective enforcement by the flag state, particularly when the ships 
involved are sailing under "flags of convenience." See also the assessment of the present 
situation by Max Edwards, Assistant Secretary for Water Pollution Control, U.S. Dept. 
of Int., in Oil Pollution and the Law, in ROME PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 295: 
In international waters we have no effective oil pollution deterrent •••• Enforce-
ment of the requirements set forth by the International Convention on Oil Pollu-
tion is not credible. There are no teeth in the prohibition against dumping in 
certain zones because the reporting of violations is on the honour system. Un• 
fortunately, the pangs of a sea captain's conscience are not an adequate deterrent 
to oil pollution. IMCO has no enforcement authority and the high seas are 
unpatrolled. 
See also Hardy, supra note 89, at 27, which points out, inter alia, that the convention 
is of little or no help in dealing with the problem of an accidental massive oil spill. 
121. There have been many suggestions for the creation of new international 
agencies to deal comprehensively with international environmental problems or with 
the oceans specifically. See, e.g., Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal, 
November 1970] Canadian Pollution Prevention Act 35 
ceptable ocean pollution control regime-perhaps one involving a 
combination of these various types of proposals rather than any one 
alone122-may, as Canada foresees, be slow in coming and difficult 
to attain. 
48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 401 (1970); the proposal by Professor Richard Baxter at the March 
1970 Columbia University Conference on the International and Interstate Regulation 
of Water Pollution, N.Y. Times, March 14, 1970, at 31, col. 2; and the reported 
consensus in favor of a unified ocean regime under international control at the recent 
Pacem in Maribus Conference on ocean problems held at Malta during July 1970, 
N.Y. Times, July 5, 1970, at 8, col. I; TIME, July 20, 1970, at 34. 
The international organization presently most concerned with maritime problems is 
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), a specialized 
agency of the United Nations. However, IMCO has only limited powers (primarily 
related to maritime safety), has dealt principally with shipping rather than general 
ocean problems, and is considered by many states to be dominated by the large ship-
owning states. There "probably would be considerable resistance to expanding its 
functions to general oceanic regulation. 
Such proposals obviously raise many issues. For example, if it preferable to deal 
separately with particular ocean pollution problems or to deal instead with ocean 
pollution on a comprehensive basis? Is ocean pollution really a separate problem or 
only a part of either the problem of general oceanic management, or alternatively, of 
general environmental management, best handled through a comprehensive agency 
operating in one of these broad areas? Can such matters be dealt with by international 
agreements establishing particular rights and obligations or are new international 
institutions with regulatory powers required? Should any such broad agency operate 
within the United Nations framework or outside of it, what should its powers be, and 
how should it reach decisions? 
While I have suggested in this Article that many nations might be reluctant to 
support an international oceanic organization with broad-ranging and significant 
powers, it is worth noting that President Nixon's recent Statement on United States 
Policy for the Seabed, supra note ll6, specifically contemplates the establishment of 
international machinery to authorize and regulate the exploration and use of seabed 
resources beyond the continental margins. Such machinery might well set a pattern for 
broader institutional development. See genera{ly U.N. Secretary-Genera!, Study of Inter-
national Machinery, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/23 (1970), prepared for the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Juris-
diction. Similarly, states might be prepared to consider some type of international 
authority designed to administer, and perhaps even police, internationally agreed anti-
pollution rules in the limited area of Arctic waters. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. I, 
1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, highly innovative in many 
other respects, stops short of establishment of such an international authority. See, e.g., 
Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INTL. &: COMP. L.Q. 436 (1960); Hayton, The 
Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM. J. INTL. L. 349 (1960); H. TAtraENFELD, A TREATY 
FOil ANTAllcrrCA, (International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 531, 1961). 
122. For example, environmental surveillance and monitoring might best be 
handled on a broadly coordinated regional or global basis, under comprehensive 
international auspices. See, e.g., the International Oceanographic Commission's LEPOR 
program, supra note II8, and the joint-research program aimed at curbing water 
pollution in the Gulf of Mexico recently agreed upon by the United States, Mexico, 
Cuba, and Jamaica, as members of the Caribbean Sea and Adjacent Regions Cooperative, 
N.Y. Times, March I, 1970, at 12, col. 8; and, for a discussion of the American-Canadian 
International Joint Commission as a pollution control agency, see Jordan, Recent 
Developments in International Environmental Pollution Control, 15 McGILL L.J. 279 
(1969). Imminent pollution threats or disasters might often be dealt with through 
regional cooperative arrangements. See, e.g., the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing 
with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, June 9, 1969, between the various states 
bordering on the North Sea, reprinted in 9 INTL. LEGAL MATEIUALS 359 (1969). En-
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The final outcome of the United States-Canadian Northwest Pas-
sage dispute remains to be seen. In response to the Canadian action, 
the United States has attempted to organize an international confer-
ence on Arctic pollution problems, to involve both Arctic and non-
Artie states and to convene perhaps in the fall of 1970. This attempt 
has encountered difficulties, however, and it is apparent that any 
such conference will face serious obstacles. As of the late summer of 
1970, it was still uncertain whether a conference would in fact be 
held; negotiations were under way in an attempt to find a formula 
that would secure general acceptance with respect to the nature of 
the conference, the states to be invited,123 and the site and date. 
Canadian participation in such a conference, which would seem 
essential to its success, may raise special problems. The Canadian 
Government has frequently indicated its disenchantment with past 
efforts for effective international action to control pollution and 
might conceivably refuse to attend the conference absent some as-
surance that the results will ratify, or at least not undermine, its claim 
to control pollution threats off the Arctic coasts.124 If Canada takes 
such an inflexible position, the United States may be faced with a 
difficult policy decision. On the one hand, there is a possible line of 
forcement of ship construction and equipment and crew-training standards might best 
be made the responsibility of the flag state. Enforcement of antipollution rules in-
volving a ship's actual operations might be most effectively entrusted to the coastal 
state affected. 
123. It is not easy to anticipate the Soviet position on the conference. While Soviet 
interests in freedom of the seas have often paralleled those of the United States, the 
Soviet Union has traditionally been sensitive as regards its own Arctic coasts and may 
be reluctant to support international arrangements tending to limit its own authority 
in offshore waters. Cf. the Soviet position with respect to the Vilkitski Strait incident, 
referred to in note 84 supra. 
124. For some expressions of the Canadian Government's views, see note 90 supra. 
The Government probably would be under strong domestic political and public 
pressures not to make any substantial concessions on this question. See, e.g., the editorial 
on Arctic Pollution in the Toronto Daily Star, July 23, 1970, at 6: 
The only way we can guard against disaster in the Arctic is to create our own 
stringent rules . • . • 
To assert this kind of control, we must make our claim to 100 miles of Arctic 
water stick. Ottawa must convince the Americans it means business. 
Canada is into a war of nerves with the U.S. State Department. The State 
Department is fronting for the oil companies ••.• 
The State Department's attempt to push through a couple of weak international 
treaties [the 1969 Brussels ConventionsJ is only the first round. From here on, the 
fighting is likely to get heavier and dirtier. 
We hope Prime Minister Trudeau has the heart for what is coming. He's 
shown himself to be pretty tough talking to Canadian postmen and unemployed 
workers and old-age pensioners. We hope he will be just as tough when he is 
talking to President Nixon about the Arctic. 
See also, in a similar vein, the editorial on Obstacle to Pollution Control, Montreal 
Gazette, July 24, 1970, at 6, cols. 1-2. 
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argument that the United States should agree to a conference on 
whatever terms Canada will accept. Under this theory, the United 
States should face up to the fact that, as a practical matter, Canada 
is unlikely to back down from its claim of the right to control pollu-
tion off its Arctic coasts, and that continued friction on this subject 
will only needlessly exacerbate United States-Canadian relations. 
However, given this de facto situation, there may be advantages, 
from the standpoint of international legal policy, in Canada taking 
such measures pursuant to a specific international arrangement 
rather than by unilateral action. Most important, an international 
agreement-even one rubber-stamping the Canadian legislation-
might restrict the precedential effects of Canada's action by indi-
cating that the international community is prepared to recognize the 
legitimacy of the pollution-control-zone concept only in the limited 
Arctic context and when approved by formal international action. 
On the other hand, there are also strong arguments that, from 
the standpoint of United States policy, it might be preferable that 
the conference not be held at all, rather than that it be held simply 
to ratify the Canadian position. In this view, any United States con-
cession to the Canadian claim, particularly one embodied in an 
international agreement, will only buttress the legitimacy of the 
pollution-control-zone concept and increase the likelihood that other 
states will copy Canada's actions. Broader American interests in free-
dom of the seas might require that the United States not compromise 
on this issue and that it make clear that it will strongly oppose such 
jurisdictional assertions on the high seas whenever and wherever 
they occur. 
It is difficult, in this context, to assume that an international 
solution to these problems will be quickly or easily reached. The dif-
ferences between the United States and Canada are substantial and 
each government publicly has taken rigid positions from which it 
may prove politically difficult to back away. Thus, at least one possi-
bility is for a continuing United States-Canadian controversy over 
this issue and perhaps a gradual broadening of the arena of conflict 
as other coastal states with similar concerns follow Canada's lead. 
However, discussions between the two governments are currently 
continuing, and one may hope that the good will and good sense 
that has typically characterized United States-Canadian relationships 
will ultimately bring an acceptable compromise. 
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APPENDIX 
TEXT OF THE CANADIAN .ARCTIC WATERS 
POLLUTION PREVENTION ACT 
[Vol. 69:1 
An Act to prevent pollution of areas of the arctic waters adjacent 
to the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic 
Whereas Parliament recognizes that recent developments in rela-
tion to the exploitation of the natural resources of arctic areas, 
including the natural resources of the Canadian arctic, and the trans-
portation of those resources to the markets of the world are of 
potentially great significance to international trade and commerce 
and to the economy of Canada in particular; 
And whereas Parliament at the same time recognizes and is 
determined to fulfil its obligation to see that the natural resources 
of the Canadian arctic are developed and exploited and the arctic 
waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic 
are navigated only in a manner that takes cognizance of Canada's 
responsibility for the welfare of the Eskimo and other inhabitants of 
the Canadian arctic and the preservation of the peculiar ecological 
balance that now exists in the water, ice and land areas of the 
Canadian arctic; 
Now therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: 
SHORT TITLE 
1. This Act may be cited as the Arctic Waters Pollution Preven-
tion Act. 
INTERPRETATION 
2. In this Act, 
(a) "analyst" means a person designated as an analyst pursuant to 
the Canada Water Act or the Northern Inland Waters Act; 
(b) "icebreaker" means a ship specially designed and constructed 
for the purpose of assisting the passage of other ships through ice; 
(c) "owner" in relation to a ship, includes any person having for 
the time being, either by law or by contract, the same rights as 
the owner of the ship as regards the possession and use thereof; 
( d) "pilot" means a person licensed as a pilot pursuant to the 
Canada Shipping Act; 
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(e) "pollution prevention officer" means a person designated as a 
pollution prevention officer pursuant to section 14; 
(f) "ship" includes any description of vessel or boat used or de-
signed for use in navigation without regard to method or lack 
of propulsion; 
(g) "shipping safety control zone" means an area of the arctic 
waters prescribed as a shipping safety control zone by order of 
the Governor in Council made under section 11; and 
(h) "waste" means 
(i) any substance that, if added to any waters would degrade 
or alter or form part of a process of degradation or alteration 
of the quality of those waters to an extent that is detrimental 
to their use by man or by an animal, fish or plant that is 
useful to man, and 
(ii) any water that contains a substance in such a quantity 
or concentration, or that has been so treated, processed or 
changed, by heat or other means, from a natural state that 
it would, if added to any waters, degrade or alter or form 
part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality 
of those waters to an extent that is detrimental to their use 
by man or by any animal, fish or plant that is useful to man, 
and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes 
anything that, for the purposes of the Canada Water Act, is 
deemed to be waste. 
APPLICATION OF ACT 
3. (I) Except where otherwise provided, this Act applies to the 
waters (in this Act referred to as the "arctic waters") adjacent to 
the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic within the area 
enclosed by the sixtieth parallel of north latitude, the one hundred 
and forty-first meridian of longitude and a line measured seaward 
from the nearest Canadian land a distance of one hundred nautical 
miles; except that in the area between the islands of the Canadian 
arctic and Greenland, where the line of equidistance between the 
islands of the Canadian arctic and Greenland is less than one hun-
dred nautical miles from the nearest Canadian land, there shall be 
substituted for the line measured seaward one hundred nautical 
miles from the nearest Canadian land such line of equidistance. 
(2) For greater certainty, the expression "arctic waters" in this 
Act includes all waters described in subsection (1) and, as this Act 
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applies to or in respect of any person described in paragraph (a) 
of subsection (I) of section 6, all waters adjacent thereto lying north 
of the sixtieth parallel of north latitude, the natural resources of 
whose subjacent submarine areas Her Majesty in right of Canada has 
the right to dispose of or exploit, whether the waters so described 
or such adjacent waters are in a frozen or a liquid state, but does not 
include inland waters. 
DEPOSIT OF WASTE 
4. (I) Except as authorized by regulations made under this sec-
tion, no person or ship shall deposit or permit the deposit of waste 
of any type in the arctic waters or in any place on the mainland or 
islands of the Canadian arctic under any conditions where such waste 
or any other waste that results from the deposit of such waste may 
enter the arctic waters. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the deposit of waste in waters 
that form part of a water quality management area designated pur-
suant to the Canada Water Act if the waste so deposited is of a type 
and quantity and is deposited under conditions authorized by regu-
lations made by the Governor in Council under paragraph (a) of 
subsection (2) of section 16 of that Act with respect to that water 
quality management area. 
(3) The Governor in Council may make regulations for the pur-
poses of this section prescribing the type and quantity of waste, if 
any, that may be deposited by any person or ship in the arctic waters 
or in any place on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic 
under any conditions where such waste or any other waste that re-
sults from the deposit of such waste may enter the arctic waters, and 
prescribing the conditions under which any such waste may be so 
deposited. 
5. (1) Any person who 
(a) has deposited waste in violation of subsection (I) of section 4, 
or 
(b) carries on any undertaking on the mainland or islands of the 
Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters that, by reason of any 
accident or other occurrence, is in danger of causing any deposit 
of waste described in that subsection otherwise than of a type, 
in a quantity and under conditions prescribed by regulations 
made under that section, 
shall forthwith report the deposit of waste or the accident or other 
November 1970) Canadian Pollution Prevention Act 41 
occurrence to a pollution prevention officer at such location and in 
such manner as may be prescribed by the Governor in Council. 
(2) The master of any ship that has deposited waste in violation 
of subsection (I) of section 4, or that is in distress and for that 
reason is in danger of causing any deposit of waste described in that 
subsection otherwise than of a type, in a quantity and under condi-
tions prescribed by regulations made under that section, shall forth-
with report the deposit of waste or the condition of distress to a 
pollution prevention officer at such location and in such manner as 
may be prescribed by the Governor in Council. 
6. (I) The following persons, namely: 
(a) any person who is engaged in exploring for, developing or 
exploiting any natural resource on any land adjacent to the arctic 
waters or in any submarine area subjacent to the arctic waters. 
(b) any person who carries on any undertaking on the mainland 
or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters, and 
( c) the mvner of any ship that navigates within the arctic waters 
and the mvner or owners of the cargo of any such ship, 
are respectively liable and, in the case of the mvner of a ship and the 
owner or mvners of the cargo thereof, are jointly and severally liable, 
up to the amount determined in the manner provided by regulations 
made under section 9 in respect of the activity or undertaking so 
engaged in or carried on or in respect of that ship, as the case may be, 
( d) for all costs and expenses of and incidental to the taking of 
action described in subsection (2) on the direction of the Gov-
ernor in Council, and 
(e) for all actual loss or damage incurred by other persons 
resulting from any deposit of waste described in subsection (I) of 
section 4 that is caused by or othenvise attributable to that activity 
or undertaking or that ship, as the case may be. 
(2) Where the Governor in Council directs any action to be taken 
by or on behalf of Her Majesty in right of Canada to repair or 
remedy any condition that results from a deposit of waste described 
in subsection (1), or to reduce or mitigate any damage to or destruc-
tion of life or property that results or may reasonably be expected to 
result from such deposit of waste, the costs and expenses of and in-
cidental to the taking of such action, to the extent that such costs 
and expenses can be established to have been reasonably incurred in 
the circumstances, are, subject to this section, recoverable by Her 
Majesty in right of Canada from the person or persons described in 
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paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of that subsection, with costs, in proceedings 
brought or taken therefor in the name of Her Majesty. 
(3) All claims pursuant to this section against a person or persons 
described in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (I) may be sued 
for and recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction in Canada, 
and all such claims shall rank firstly in favour of persons who have 
suffered actual loss or damage as provided in paragraph (e) of sub-
section (I) (which said claims shall among themselves rank pari 
passu) and secondly to meet the costs and expenses described in 
subsection (2), hereof, up to the limit of the amount determined 
in the manner provided by regulations made under section 9 in 
respect of the activity or undertaking engaged in or carried on by 
the person or persons against whom the claims are made, or in re-
spect of the ship of which any such person is the owner or of all or 
part of whose cargo any such person is the owner. 
(4) No proceedings in respect of a claim pursuant to this section 
shall be commenced after two years from the time when the deposit 
of waste in respect of which the proceedings are brought or taken 
occurred or first occurred, as the case may be, or could reasonably 
be expected to have become known to those affected thereby. 
7. (I) The liability of any person pursuant to section 6 is absolute 
and does not depend upon proof of fault or negligence, except that 
no person is liable pursuant to that section for any costs, expenses 
or actual loss or damage incurred by another person whose conduct 
caused any deposit of waste described in subsection (I) of that sec-
tion, or whose conduct contributed to any such deposit of waste, to 
the degree to which his conduct contributed thereto, and nothing 
in this Act shall be construed as limiting or restricting any right of 
recourse or indemnity that a person liable pursuant to section 6 
may have against any other person. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a reference to any conduct 
of "another person" includes any wrongful act or omission by that 
other person or by any person for whose wrongful act or omission 
that other person is by law responsible. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, no person is liable 
pursuant to section 6, either alone or jointly and severally with any 
other person or persons, by reason only of his being the owner of all 
or any part of the cargo of a ship if he can establish that the cargo 
or part thereof of which he is the owner is of such a nature, or is 
of such a nature and is carried in such a quantity that, if it and any 
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other cargo of the same nature that is carried by that ship were de-
posited by that ship in the arctic waters, the deposit thereof would 
not constitute a violation of subsection (I) of section 4. 
8. (I) The Governor in Council may require 
(a) any person who engages in exploring for, developing or ex-
ploiting any natural resource on any land adjacent to the arctic 
waters or in any submarine area subjacent to the arctic waters, 
(b) any person who carries on any undertaking on the mainland 
or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters that will 
or is likely to result in the deposit of waste in the arctic waters or 
in any place under any conditions where such waste or any other 
waste that results from the deposit of such waste may enter the 
arctic waters, 
(c) any person, other than a person described in paragraph (a). 
who proposes to construct, alter or extend any work or works on 
the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic 
waters that, upon completion thereof, will form all or part of an 
undertaking described in paragraph (b), or 
(d) the owner of any ship that proposes to navigate or that navi-
gates within any shipping safety control zone specified by the 
Governor in Council and, subject to subsection (3) of section 7, 
the owner or owners of the cargo of any such ship, 
to provide evidence of financial responsibility, in the form of insur-
ance or an indemnity bond satisfactory to the Governor in Council, 
or in any other form satisfactory to him, in an amount determined 
in the manner provided by regulations made under section 9. 
(2) Evidence of :financial responsibility in the form of insurance 
or an indemnity bond shall be in a form that will enable any person 
entitled pursuant to section 6 to claim against the person or persons 
giving such evidence of financial responsibility to recover directly 
from the proceeds of such insurance or bond. 
9. The Governor in Council may make regulations for the pur-
poses of section 6 prescribing, in respect of any activity or under-
taking engaged in or carried on by any person or persons described 
in paragraph (a), (b) of (c) of subsection (I) of section 6, or in re-
spect of any ship of which any such person is the owner or of all or 
part of whose cargo any such person is the owner, the manner of 
determining the limit of liability of any such person or persons pur-
suant to that section, which prescribed manner shall, in the case of 
the owner of any ship and the owner or owners of the cargo thereof, 
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take into account the size of such ship and the nature and quantity 
of the cargo carried or to be carried by it. 
PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF WORKS 
10. (I) The Governor in Council may require any person who 
proposes to construct, alter or extend any work or works on the 
mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters 
that, upon completion thereof, will form all or part of an under-
taking the operation of which will or is likely to result in the de-
posit of waste of any type in the arctic waters or in any place under 
any conditions where such waste or any other waste that results from 
the deposit of such waste may enter the arctic waters, to provide him 
with a copy of such plans and specifications relating to the work or 
works as will enable him to determine whether the deposit of waste 
that will or is likely to occur if the construction, alteration or exten-
sion is carried out in accordance therewith would constitute a viola-
tion of subsection (I) of section 4. 
(2) If, after reviewing any plans and specifications provided to 
him under subsection (I) and affording to the person who provided 
those plans and specifications a reasonable opportunity to be heard, 
the Governor in Council is of the opinion that the deposit of waste 
that will or is likely to occur if the construction, alteration or exten-
sion is carried out in accordance with such plans and specifications 
would constitute a violation of subsection (1) of section 4, he may, 
by order, either 
(a) require such modifications in those plans and specifications as 
he considers to be necessary, or 
(b) prohibit the carrying out of the construction, alteration or 
extension. 
SHIPPING SAFETY CONTROL ZONES 
11. (I) Subjects to subsection (2), the Governor in Council may, 
by order, prescribe as a shipping safety control zone any area of 
the arctic waters specified in the order, and may, as he deems neces-
sary, amend any such area. 
(2) A copy of each order that the Governor in Council proposes 
to make under subsection (1) shall be published in the Canada 
Gazette; and no order may be made by the Governor in Council 
under subsection (I) based upon any such proposal except after the 
expiration of sixty days following publication of the proposal in the 
Canada Gazette. 
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12. (I) The Governor in Council may make regulations applicable 
to ships of any class or classes specified therein, prohibiting any ship 
of that class or of any of those classes from navigating within any 
shipping safety control zone specified therein 
(a) unless the ship complies with standards prescribed by the 
regulations relating to 
(i) hull and fuel tank construction, including the strength of 
materials used therein, the use of double hulls and the sub-
division thereof into watertight compartments, 
(ii) the construction of machinery and equipment and the 
electronic and other navigational aids and equipment and 
telecommunications equipment to be carried and the manner 
and frequency of maintenance thereof, 
(iii) the nature and construction of propelling power and 
appliances and fittings for steering and stabilizing, 
(iv) the manning of the ship, including the number of navi-
gating and look-out personnel to be carried who are qualified 
in a manner prescribed by the regulations, 
(v) with respect to any type of cargo to be carried, the maxi-
mum quantity thereof that may be carried, the method of 
stowage thereof and the nature or type and quantity of sup-
plies and equipment to be carried for use in repairing or 
remedying any condition that may result from the deposit of 
any such cargo in the arctic waters, 
(vi) the freeboard to be allowed and the marking of load lines, 
(vii) quantities of fuel, water and other supplies to be carried, 
and 
(viii) the maps, charts, tide tables and any other documents 
or publications relating to navigation in the arctic waters to 
be carried; 
(b) without the aid of a pilot, or of an ice navigator who is 
qualified in a manner prescribed by the regulations, at any time 
or during any period or periods of the year, if any, specified in 
the regulations, or without icebreaker assistance of a kind pre-
scribed by the regulations; and 
( c) during any period or periods of the year, if any, specified in 
the regulations or when the ice conditions of a kind specified 
in the regulations exist in that zone. 
(2) The Governor in Council may by order exempt from the 
application of any regulations made under subsection (I) any ship 
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or class of ship that is owned or operated by a sovereign power other 
than Canada where the Governor in Council is satisfied that appro-
priate measures have been taken by or under the authority of that 
sovereign power to ensure the compliance of such ship with, or with 
standards substantially equivalent to, standards prescribed by regu-
lations made under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) that would other-
wise be applicable to it within any shipping safety control zone, and 
that in all other respects all reasonable precautions have been or will 
be taken to reduce the danger of any deposit of waste resulting from 
the navigation of such ship within that shipping safety control zone. 
(3) The Governor in Council may make regulations providing for 
the issue to the owner or master of any ship that proposes to navigate 
within any shipping safety control zone specified therein, of a certif-
icate evidencing, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
the compliance of such ship with standards prescribed by regulations 
made under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) that are or would be 
applicable to it within that shipping safety control zone, and gov-
erning the use that may be made of any such certificate and the 
effect that may be given thereto for the purposes of any provision 
of this Act. 
13. (1) Where the Governor in Council has reasonable cause to 
believe that a ship that is within the arctic waters and is in distress, 
stranded, wrecked, sunk or abandoned, is depositing waste or is likely 
to deposit waste in the arctic waters, he may cause the ship or any 
cargo or other material on board the ship to be destroyed, if neces-
sary, or to be removed if possible to such place and sold in such 
manner as he may direct. 
(2) The proceeds from the sale of a ship or any cargo or other 
material pursuant to subsection (1) shall be applied towards meeting 
the expenses incurred by the Government of Canada in removing 
and selling the ship, cargo or other material, and any surplus shall 
be paid to the owner of that ship, cargo or other material. 
POLLUTION PREVENTION OFFICERS 
14. (1) The Governor in Council may designate any person as 
a pollution prevention officer with such of the powers set out in 
sections 15 and 23 as are specified in the certificate of designation 
of such person. 
(2) A pollution prevention officer shall be furnished with a cer-
tificate of his designation specifying the powers set out in sections 
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15 and 23 that are vested in him, and a pollution prevention officer, 
on exercising any such power shall, if so required, produce the cer-
tificate to any person in authority who is affected thereby and who 
requires him to do so. 
15. (1) A pollution prevention officer may, at any reasonable time, 
(a) enter any area, place or premises (other than a ship, a private 
dwelling place or any part of any area, place or premises other 
than a ship that is designed to be used and is being used as a 
permanent or temporary private dwelling place) occupied by any 
person described in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of sec-
tion 8, in which he reasonably believes 
(i) there is being or has been carried on any activity that may 
result in or has resulted in waste, or 
(ii) there is any waste 
that may be or has been deposited in the arctic waters or on the 
mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic under any conditions 
where such waste or any other waste that results from the deposit 
of such waste may enter the arctic waters in violation of subsec-
tion (1) of section 4; 
(b) examine any waste found therein in bulk or open any con-
tainer found therein that he has reason to believe contains any 
waste and take samples thereof; and 
( c) require any person in such area, place or premises to produce 
for inspection or for the purpose of obtaining copies thereof or 
extracts therefrom, any books or other documents or papers con-
cerning any matter relevant to the administration of this Act or 
the regulations. 
(2) A pollution prevention officer may, at any reasonable time, 
(a) enter any area, place or premises (other than a ship, a private 
dwelling place or any part of any area, place or premises other 
than a ship that is designed to be used and is being used as a 
permanent or temporary private dwelling place) in which any 
construction, alteration or extension of a work or works described 
in section 10 is being carried on; and 
(b) conduct such inspections of the work or works being con-
structed, altered or extended as he deems necessary in order to 
determine whether any plans and specifications provided by the 
Governor in Council, and any modifications required by the Gov-
ernor in Council are being complied with. 
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(3) A pollution prevention officer may 
(a) go on board any ship that is within a shipping safety control 
zone and conduct such inspection thereof as will enable him to 
determine whether the ship complies with standards prescribed 
by any regulations made under section 12 that are applicable to 
it within that shipping safety control zone; 
(b) order any ship that is in or near a shipping safety control zone 
to proceed outside such zone in such manner as he may direct, to 
remain outside such zone or to anchor in a place selected by him, 
(i) if he suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the ship fails 
to comply with standards prescribed by any regulations made 
under section 12 that are or would be applicable to it within 
that shipping safety control zone, 
(ii) if such ship is within the shipping safety control zone or 
is about to enter the zone in contravention of a regulation 
made under paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of section 
12, or 
(iii) if, by reason of weather, visibility, ice or sea conditions, 
the condition of the ship or its equipment or the nature of 
its cargo, he is satisfied that such an order is justified in the 
interests of safety; and 
( c) where he is informed that a substantial quantity of waste has 
been deposited in the arctic waters or has entered the arctic 
waters, or where on reasonable grounds, he is satisfied that a 
grave and imminent danger of a substantial deposit of waste in 
the arctic waters exists, 
(i) order all ships within a specified area of the arctic waters 
to report their positions to him, and 
(ii) order any ship to take part in the clean-up of such waste or 
in any action to control or contain the waste. 
16. The owner or person in charge of any area, place or premises 
entered pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) of section 15, the master 
of any ship boarded pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of 
that section and every person found in the area, place or premises 
or on board the ship shall give the pollution prevention officer all 
reasonable assistance in his power to enable the pollution prevention 
officer to carry out his duties and functions under this Act and shall 
furnish the pollution prevention officer with such information as he 
may reasonably require. 
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17. (I) No person shall obstruct or hinder a pollution prevention 
officer in the carrying out of his duties or functions under this Act. 
(2) No person shall knowingly make a false or misleading state-
ment, either verbally or in writing, to a pollution prevention officer 
engaged in carrying out his duties or functions under this Act. 
OFFENCES 
18. (I) Any person who violates subsection (I) of section 4 and 
any ship that violates that subsection is guilty of an offence and 
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding, in the case of 
a person, five thousand dollars, and in the case of a ship, one hundred 
thousand dollars. 
(2) Where an offence is committed by a person under subsection 
(I) on more than one day or is continued by him for more than one 
day, it shall be deemed to be a separate offence for each day on which 
the offence is committed or continued. 
19. (I) Any person who 
(a) fails to make a report to a pollution prevention officer as and 
when required under subsection (I) of section 5, 
(b) fails to provide the Governor in Council with evidence of 
financial responsibility as and when required under subsection 
(I) of section 8, 
( c) fails to provide the Governor in Council with any plans and 
specifications required of him under subsection (I) of section 10, 
or 
(d) constructs, alters or extends any work described in subsection 
(I) of section IO 
(i) otherwise than in accordance with any plans and specifica-
tions provided to the Governor in Council in accordance with 
a requirement made under that subsection, or with any such 
plans and specifications as required to be modified by any 
order made under subsection (2) of that section, or 
(ii) contrary to any order made under subsection (2) of that 
section prohibiting the carrying out of such construction, al-
teration or extension, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine 
not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars. 
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(2) Any ship 
(a) that navigates within a shipping safety control zone while not 
complying with standards prescribed by any regulations made 
under section 12 that are applicable to it within that shipping 
safety control zone, 
(b) that navigates within a shipping safety control zone in contra-
vention of a regulation made under paragraph (b) or (c) of sub-
section (1) of section 12, 
(c) that, having taken on board a pilot in order to comply with 
a regulation made under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of sec-
tion 12, fails to comply with any reasonable direction given to it 
by the pilot in carrying out his duties, 
(d) that fails to comply with any order of a pollution prevention 
officer under paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection (3) of section 15 
that is applicable to it, 
(e) the master of which fails to make a report to a pollution pre-
vention officer as and when required under subsection (2) of sec-
tion 5, or 
(f) the master of which or any person on board which violates 
section 17, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine 
not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars. 
(3) Any person, other than the master of a ship or any person on 
board a ship, who violates section 17 is guilty of an offence punishable 
on summary conviction. 
20. (I) In a prosecution of a person for an offence under sub-
section (1) of section 18, it is sufficient proof of the offence to estab-
lish that it was committed by an employee or agent of the accused 
whether or not the employee or agent is identified or has been prose-
cuted for the offence, unless the accused establishes that the offence 
was committed without his knowledge or consent and that he exer-
cised all due diligence to prevent its commission. 
(2) In a prosecution of a ship for an offence under this Act, it is 
sufficient proof that the ship has committed the offence to establish 
that the act or neglect, that constitutes the offence was committed 
by the master of or any person on board the ship, other than a pol-
lution prevention officer or a pilot taken on board in compliance 
with a regulation made under paragraph (b) of subsection (I) of 
section 12, whether or not the person on board the ship has been 
identified; and for the purposes of any prosecution of a ship for fail-
November 1970] Canadian Pollution Prevention Act 51 
ing to comply with any order or direction of a pollution prevention 
officer or a pilot, any order given by such pollution prevention officer 
or any direction given by such pilot to the master or any person on 
board the ship shall be deemed to have been given to the ship. 
21. (1) Subject to this section, a certificate of an analyst stating 
that he has analysed or examined a sample submitted to him by a 
pollution prevention officer and stating the result of his analysis or 
examination is admissible in evidence in any prosecution for a viola-
tion of subsection (1) of section 4 and in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary is proof of the statements contained in the certificate 
without proof of the signature or the official character of the person 
appearing to have signed the certificate. 
(2) The party against whom a certificate of an analyst is produced 
pursuant to subsection (1) may, with leave of the court require the 
attendance of the analyst for the purposes of cross-examination. 
(3) No certificate shall be received in evidence pursuant to sub-
section (1) unless the party intending to produce it has given to the 
party against whom it is intended to be produced reasonable notice 
of such intention together with a copy of the certificate. 
22. (1) Where any person or ship is charged with having com-
mitted an offence under this Act, any court in Canada that would 
have had cognizance of the offence if it had been committed by a 
person within the limits of its ordinary jurisdiction has jurisdiction 
to try the offence as if it had been so committed. 
(2) Where a ship is charged with having committed an offence 
under this Act, the summons may be served by leaving the same with 
the master or any officer of the ship or by posting the summons on 
some conspicuous part of the ship, and the ship may appear by coun-
sel or agent, but if it does not appear, a summary conviction court 
may, upon proof of service of the summons, proceed ex parte to hold 
the trial. 
SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE 
23. (I) Whenever a pollution prevention officer suspects on rea-
sonable grounds that 
(a) any provision of this Act or the regulations has been contra-
vened by a ship, or 
(b) the owner of a ship or the owner or o-wners of all or part of 
the cargo thereof has or have committed an offence under para-
graph (b) of subsection (I) of section 19, 
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he may, with the consent of the Governor in Council, seize the ship 
and its cargo anywhere in the arctic waters or elsewhere in the terri-
torial sea or internal or inland waters of Canada. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) and section 24, a ship and cargo 
seized under subsection (1) shall be retained in the custody of the 
pollution prevention officer making the seizure or shall be delivered 
into the custody of such person as the Governor in Council directs. 
(3) Where all or any part of a cargo seized under subsection (1) 
is perishable, the pollution prevention officer or other person having 
custody thereof may sell the cargo or the portion thereof that is 
perishable, as the case may be, and the proceeds of the sale shall be 
paid to the Receiver General or shall be deposited in a chartered 
bank to the credit of the Receiver General. 
24. (1) Where a ship is convicted of an offence under this Act, 
or where the owner of a ship or an owner of all or of part of the 
cargo thereof has been convicted of an offence under paragraph (b) 
of subsection (1) of section 19, the convicting court may, if the ship 
and its cargo were seized under subsection (1) of section 23, in addi-
tion to any other penalty imposed, order that the ship and cargo or 
the ship or its cargo or any part thereof be forfeited, and upon the 
making of such order the ship and cargo or the ship or its cargo or 
part thereof is or are forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada. 
(2) Where any cargo or part thereof that is ordered to be forfeited 
under subsection (1) has been sold under subsection (3) of section 23, 
the proceeds of such sale are, upon the making of such order, for-
feited to Her Majesty in right of Canada. 
(3) Where a ship and cargo have been seized under subsection (1) 
of section 23 and proceedings that could result in an order that the 
ship and cargo be forfeited having been instituted, the court in or 
before which the proceedings have been instituted may, with the 
consent of the Governor in Council, order redelivery thereof to the 
person from whom they were seized upon security by bond, with two 
sureties, in an amount and form satisfactory to the Governor in 
Council, being given to Her Majesty in right of Canada. 
(4) Any ship and cargo seized under subsection (1) of section 23 
or the proceeds realized from a sale of any perishable cargo under 
subsection (3) of that section shall be returned or paid to the person 
from whom the ship and cargo were seized within thirty days from 
the seizure thereof unless, prior to the expiration of the thirty days, 
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proceedings are instituted in respect of an offence alleged to have 
been committed by the ship against this Act or in respect of an 
offence under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 19 alleged 
to have been committed by the owner of the ship or an owner of all 
or part of the cargo thereof. 
(5) Where proceedings referred to in subsection (4) are instituted 
and, at the final conclusion of those proceedings, a ship and cargo or 
ship or cargo or part thereof is or are ordered to be forfeited, they 
or it may, subject to section 25, be disposed of as the Governor in 
Council directs. 
(6) Where a ship and cargo have been seized under subsection (1) 
of section 23 and proceedings referred to in subsection (4) have been 
instituted, but the ship and cargo or ship or cargo or part thereof or 
any proceeds realized from the sale of any part of the cargo are not 
at the final conclusion of the proceedings ordered to be forfeited, they 
or it shall be returned or the proceeds shall be paid to the person 
from whom the ship and cargo were seized, unless there has been a 
conviction and a fine imposed in which case the ship and cargo or 
proceeds may be detained until the fine is paid, or the ship and cargo 
may be sold under execution in satisfaction of the fine, or the pro-
ceeds realized from a sale of the cargo or any part thereof may be 
applied in payment of the fine. 
25. (1) The provisions of section 64A of the Fisheries Act apply, 
with such modifications as the circumstances require, in respect of 
any ship and cargo forfeited under this Act as though the ship and 
cargo were respectively, a vessel and goods forfeited under subsection 
(5) of section 64 of that Act. 
(2) References to "the Minister" in section 64A of the Fisheries 
Act shall, in applying that section for the purposes of this Act, 
be read as references to the Governor in Council and the phrase 
"other than a person convicted of the offence that resulted in the 
forfeiture or a person in whose possession the vessel, vehicle, article, 
goods or fish were when seized" shall be deemed to include a refer-
ence to the owner of the ship where it is the ship that is convicted 
of the offence that results in the forfeiture. 
DELEGATION 
26. (1) The Governor in Council may, by order, delegate to any 
member of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada designated in the 
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order the power and authority to do any act or thing that the Gov-
ernor in Council is directed or empowered to do under this Act; 
and upon the making of such an order, the provision or provisions 
of this Act that direct or empower the Governor in Council and to 
which the order relates shall be read as if the title of the member of 
the Queen's Privy Council for Canada designated in the order were 
substituted therein for the expression "The Governor in Council". 
(2) This section does not apply to authorize the Governor in 
Council to delegate any power vested in him under this Act to make 
regulations, to prescribe shipping safety control zones or to designate 
pollution prevention officers and their powers, other than pollution 
prevention officers with only those powers set out in subsection (1) 
or (2) of section 15. 
DISPOSmON OF FINES 
27. All fines imposed pursuant to this Act belong to Her Majesty 
in right of Canada and shall be paid to the Receiver General. 
COMING INTO FORCE 
28. This Act shall come into force on a day to be fixed by 
proclamation. 
